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The siege of Fort Motte took place between May 6 and 12, 1781. This battle was 
part of the American offensive against British posts in South Carolina during the 
American Revolution. During the siege, British troops were confined within the fort 
while American Continental forces as well as the South Carolina militia maintained a 
presence outside the walls. In addition to discussing the general history of the battle, I 
will specifically discuss the cultural variability of lead shot recovered from this site 
during archaeological excavation and systematic metal detection between 2004 and 
2012. During the mid-eighteenth century, British troops were issued .75 caliber 
muskets. American Continentals were generally armed with .69 caliber muskets. The 
South Carolina militia was armed with a variety of firearms including muskets and rifles. 
Due to the firearm technology of the eighteenth century, it is possible to determine the 
type of firearm that fired individual lead shot. Surface characteristics as well as the 
weight and diameter of lead shot can be used to identify individual action. This 
information, combined with spatial distribution data, allows a close analysis of group 
and individual combat behavior in the context of the battle. This behavior is then 
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Ivor Noel Hume famously stated that “little can be said about battlefield sites” 
(1969: 188). However, I argue that a great deal can be said about battlefields and other 
conflict sites. Archaeological research conducted at conflict sites has been able to offer 
valuable information pertaining to battle location, tactics, technology, and human 
behavior that would otherwise not be available (Legg and Smith 2007; Scott 2001; Scott 
and Fox 1987; Smith et al. 2007). Fox (1993:5) states that “combat behavior is, from the 
archaeological perspective, no more and no less susceptible to analyses than any other 
form of human endeavor.” Therefore, combat behavior can be analyzed using 
theoretical ideas rooted in the social sciences, specifically anthropology. This thesis will 
incorporate the archaeological investigation of the Siege of Fort Motte into a theoretical 
framework that is fundamentally anthropological. I will examine individual combat 
behavior evident through a detailed lead shot analysis in terms of agency.  
1.1 CONFLICT ARCHAEOLOGY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 
Several archaeologists have asserted the possibilities of studying agency from 
the material record (Dobres and Robb 2000; Dornan 2002; Hodder 2000; Johnson 1989; 
Robb 2010; Saitta 1994). However, few have studied the material evidence of individual 
agency (Dornan 2002; Hodder 2000). This is due to the fact that it can be difficult to see 
the historical actions of an individual. In this regard, conflict sites are uniquely suited to
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the study of individual action. Battlefields and many other military sites were occupied 
for a short period of time. Therefore, conflict archaeologists are offered a window into 
either a single event or a short-term occupation. This increases the “potential to 
examine not only general human behavior across the site but often individual actions” 
(Scott and McFeaters 2011: 107). 
While much archaeological work has been conducted at conflict sites and several 
archaeologists (Fox 1993; Scott 2001; Scott and McFeaters 2011) have been able to 
trace individual behavior on a battlefield, no archaeologist has analyzed such combat 
behavior in terms of individual agency. Conflict archaeology provides a unique 
opportunity for such an analysis due to the nature of conflict sites and the fact that 
agency is most evident within a particular event.  
Additionally, in no other area of human behavior is action so highly structured as 
the military. The soldier has been trained to obey certain rules of conduct. Thus, a study 
of individual agency and practice is directly suited to conflict archaeology. Military 
manuals and other historic records provide documentation of ideal and expected 
combat behavior. While it is understood that these ideals were not always acted upon in 
real conflict situations, such documents offer a glimpse into normative military action. I 
will use historical sources that detail normative eighteenth century tactics and compare 
these to the behavior seen in the archaeological record at Fort Motte and then evaluate 





1.2 AMMUNITION ANALYSIS AS A MEANS OF OBSERVING CULTURAL VARIABILITY AND 
INDIVIDUAL ACTION 
 
It is possible to observe individual combatant action based on a detailed 
ammunition analysis. Conflict sites consist almost entirely of metal artifacts. Among 
these, ammunition is the most abundant. A close analysis of ammunition can tell us a 
great deal about military culture, tactics, and individual behavior. 
A few archaeologists have suggested the possibility of assessing the cultural 
variability of ammunition (Drexler 2003; Scott 2001; Scott and Fox 1987). These analyses 
have focused on the Civil War and the later Indian Wars.1 Doug Scott and Richard Fox 
have been especially active in this type of research. Due to the firearm technology of the 
later nineteenth century, archaeologists (Fox 1993; Scott 2000; Scott 2001; Scott and 
Haag 2009) were able to determine the type of firearms in use at several battlefield 
sites. Additionally, these archaeologists were able to use modern forensic methodology 
to ascertain unique cartridge-case signatures, or firearm-specific grooves and scratches 
imparted upon each cartridge case during the firing and ejection process (Scott 2000; 
Scott and Haag 2009). Such cartridge-case signatures have been used to trace individual 
firearm and combatant movement across a battlefield landscape, giving the 
archaeologist the “opportunity to observe and analyze a series of individual combatant 
behaviors within a narrow temporal context” (Scott and McFeaters 2011: 109).  
This thesis asserts that a close analysis of eighteenth century spherical lead shot 
can allow archaeologists to trace and analyze the actions of individual soldiers across a 
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battlefield in a manner similar to Scott and Fox (1987) at the Little Big Horn battlefield 
(Chapter 6). However, there will need to be methodological modifications when 
assessing individual action and cultural variability based on lead shot recovered from an 
eighteenth century battlefield. This is due to the differences in firearm and ammunition 
technology between the American Revolution and the Civil War. Metal cartridges were 
not used during the eighteenth century so certain forensic methods will not be useful 
here. However, lead shot from this time period does exhibit a remarkable amount of 
cultural variation, in the form of surface marks and impressions, which can be analyzed. 
At many archaeological investigations of eighteenth century historical sites lead 
shot is taken for granted; it is assumed to offer limited, if any, information about a site 
and is often quickly cataloged and never looked at again. However, lead shot can tell us 
much about a site.2 A close analysis of spherical lead shot can offer insight into the types 
of firearms in use at a particular time, the location of various battle events, tactics used, 
individual action, as well as insight into the daily-life practices of soldiers and militiamen. 
This thesis will focus its analysis on the types of firearms in use at a single battle (Fort 
Motte) and the significant information that can be gathered regarding individual combat 
behavior.  
1.3 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY FIREARM TECHNOLOGY 
The firearm technology of the eighteenth century makes it possible to determine 
the use of specific guns from the material record of a battlefield (Legg in Smith et al. 
2007; Sivilich 2007). Muskets and rifles made up the majority of firearms in use for 
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 This information is not limited to a battle event, but includes valuable information regarding subjects 
such as domestic slaughtering and hunting practices. 
5 
 
military engagements at the time. As a result of the different manufacture and technical 
attributes of rifles and muskets, lead shot for these two types of firearms are dissimilar 
in size.  
It is argued here that eighteenth century spherical lead shot exhibits cultural 
variability in the form of marks and impression caused by the technology and use of the 
firearm and as a result of human behavior on the battlefield. At the time of the 
American Revolution, two general types of muskets were used: the British Land Pattern 
musket3 (.75 caliber) and the French Charleville musket (.69 caliber). The British musket 
fired a large .75 caliber ball. Ammunition for these muskets was produced en masse and 
was relatively standardized in size and weight (Chapter 3). Thus, it is possible to 
determine the type of musket used, as well as probable cultural affiliation, based on the 
size of the musket ball.  
However, cultural variability is also determined by archaeological context. Both 
British and American forces were known to have captured and utilized enemy firearms 
and ammunition (Bass 1959). Ultimately, there were a variety of weapons in use. In 
order to determine which side fired an individual ball one needs to look closely at the 
context in which it is found.  
Unlike muskets, eighteenth century rifles were far from standardized and 
showed distinct evidence of “individual craftsmanship” (Peterson 2000: 194). Rifles 
were manufactured individually along with a shot mold that would cast lead shot 
specifically for that particular firearm. Rifle balls were consistently much smaller in 
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 The British Land Pattern musket has come to be commonly known as the Brown Bess musket; however, 
as it was not known by this name during the eighteenth century, I will avoid using this misnomer.  
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diameter than any of the musket balls of the time but otherwise differed widely from 
one another. Rifle balls can range from .30 caliber to .60 caliber, however the most 
common range during the time of the Revolution was between .50 to .55 caliber (Legg in 
Smith et al. 2007: 55).  
In the material record, one can see individual rifle action based on the frequency 
and distribution of different caliber rifle balls. Within the context of a single battlefield 
assemblage, a cluster of a certain caliber may indicate the action of an individual 
rifleman. Admittedly, there is the possibility that multiple individuals were firing rifles 
with very similar bore diameters, and therefore the same size shot may be the result of 
more than one individual.  Keeping this in mind, it is still possible to determine the 
probable action of individual combatants based on a careful analysis of lead shot from a 
single battle. 
1.4 LEAD SHOT ANALYSIS 
As discussed above, the diameter of a lead ball can determine the type of 
weapon that fired it or that was designed to fire it. Critically, the diameter of spherical 
lead shot is readily determined by its weight even if it has been fired. A weight/diameter 
analysis of lead shot can be useful for interpreting a Revolutionary War site; a similar 
analysis was conducted by Daniel Sivilich in 1996.4 Sivilich (1996: 104) developed a 
formula that enabled the calculation of a projected diameter of mutilated lead shot.5 
This formula and its use in my analysis will be discussed further in Chapter 6.  
                                                          
4
 Sivilich (1996) focused on the weight/diameter distribution of .69 caliber and .75 caliber musket balls 
from Monmouth Battlefield, a Revolutionary War site in New Jersey.  
5
 Diameter in inches = 0.223204 x (Weight in grams)1/3 
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A few archaeologists (Legg and Smith 2007; Legg in Smith et al. 2007) have 
conducted detailed analyses of eighteenth century lead shot.6 However, no one has 
utilized such an analysis for the purpose of discussing agency in relation to the larger 
structure of military culture and combat behavior. I will look at eighteenth century 
tactics in use at the time of the American Revolution and compare the ideal or 
normative behavior to the actual behavior seen in the archaeological record at Fort 
Motte. Additionally, I will look at what these individual actions tell us about combat 
behavior and military culture during the time of the American Revolution. Specifically, 
how did larger cultural and technological changes affect the range of possible individual 
action at a mid-eighteenth century battle? 
It is imperative that conflict archaeologists be familiar with different cultures and 
their “manner of war-making” (Bleed and Scott 2011: 49) as culture affects the way a 
nation or region fights (Hanson 2001). A familiarity with military culture is necessary to 
decipher behavioral patterns seen in the material record. In his analysis of the Battle of 
the Big Hole, Scott (2001) specifically looked at bullet and cartridge case distributions to 
determine where individual guns were fired and aimed. Scott (2001) then used Upton’s 
(1867) proscribed tactics of Army operation as well as contemporary accounts of Nez 
Perce tactics to assess the cultural affiliation of the combatant behind each firearm. 
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 Legg and Smith (2007) conducted interviews with collectors of the Revolutionary War battlefield of 
Camden. From this data the authors produced a “generalized lead shot density map” (Legg and Smith 
2007: 216). This map showed specifically where the battle was located and which positions received 
heavier fire. Later Smith and Legg (2007) conducted a controlled metal detector survey of the battlefield. 
Detected items were documented using GPS technology to mark their exact location. Each artifact was 
then designated by type. The most common artifact was lead shot, including musket balls and buckshot. 




I will conduct a similar study in which I analyze lead shot distribution patterns 
and then compare these patterns to normative military practice of the mid-eighteenth 
century. To do this, it will be necessary to understand individual actions and goals within 
cultural and tactical changes over time. This focus will help to situate individual soldiers 
and militiamen within a larger structural framework. Therefore, I will give a detailed 
background of eighteenth century military culture for both the British and American 
combatants involved in the American Revolution (Chapter 3). While it is acknowledged 
that several nations were involved in this struggle, I will focus primarily on the military 
practice of Britain and the American colonies.  
1.5 FORT MOTTE 
The Siege of Fort Motte took place on May 6-12, 1781. This small-scale battle 
was a decisive part of a larger American offensive against British outposts in the 
southern colonies during the American Revolution (Smith et al. 2007). Brigadier General 
Francis Marion and Lieutenant Colonel Henry Lee commanded the American 
Continentals and South Carolina militiamen who besieged Fort Motte, a civilian planter’s 
home that had been fortified by the British in January 1781. As the siege progressed, 
Marion utilized riflemen to suppress the British defense as slaves under the direction of 
Lee’s Continentals dug a siege approach trench (sap) towards the fort (Smith et al. 
2007). After several days of sniping and digging, the Americans decided to end things 
quickly by setting fire to the fort. The British surrendered on May 12. The siege will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
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The Fort Motte battlefield is located in Calhoun County, South Carolina (Figure 
1.1). The first archaeological excavations and systematic metal detection were carried 
out at the site in 2004. For the purposes of this thesis, additional excavation and metal 
detection was conducted in May and November of 2012. Archaeological excavations at 
Fort Motte have revealed much about the practice of eighteenth century tactics and 
have allowed researchers a better understanding of the fort itself as well as the siege. 
Excavations have uncovered portions of a moat and palisade constructed by the British 
around a civilian house. A siege approach (sap) has also been identified. Many of the 
battle events at Fort Motte have been primarily ascertained through the close analysis 
of musket and rifle shot recovered from the site.  
Initial analysis of the lead shot recovered between 2004 and 2006 indicated that 
there was an extremely high percentage of .54 caliber rifle balls (Legg in Smith et al. 
2007). It was hypothesized that this anomaly represents the sharpshooting activity of an 
individual rifleman. To test this hypothesis, further metal detection and archaeological 
excavations were conducted in 2012 in order to gain additional data. The analysis of this 
data will be presented in Chapter 7 and will include data from all field seasons between 
2004 and 2012. Several new conclusions were drawn. Interestingly, after a closer re-
analysis of the lead shot, the unique actions of several individuals were able to be seen 
in the material record.  
My analysis indicates that at least two individuals contributed to the deposition 
of rifle balls within the anomalous data set. This is due to the evidence of both “unrifled 
10 
 
‘rifles’” (Legg in Smith et al. 2007: I-5), or smoothbore rifles, as well as true rifle 
characteristics on the 15g/.54 caliber shot.  
 
 
Figure 1.1 Fort Motte general location map 
 
My analysis of agency and practice is not limited to the American riflemen. 
Perhaps the strongest evidence of intentional individual action comes from the material 
remains of British or Loyalist troops at Fort Motte. A significant number of fired .75 
11 
 
caliber musket balls were recovered in an oval cluster to the northeast of the fort. 
Several of these balls have a very strong smoothbore barrel mark, indicating that they 
were fired from a .69 caliber musket. It is hypothesized that this cluster of shot and 
specifically the barrel-marked balls are indirect evidence of the American sap. Firing a 
.75 caliber ball from a .69 caliber musket firearm would minimize the windage (the 
difference between the diameter of the bore, or caliber, and the diameter of the ball) in 
a similar manner as a rifle. Firing a ball with minimal windage in the bore of the firearm 
served to increase the accuracy and distance of the fired ball. The individual firing .75 
caliber shot from a .69 caliber musket was attempting to achieve the same goal as a 
rifleman: he wished to accurately strike a specific target. It is argued that this individual 
used the knowledge and technology available to him to increase the accuracy of a 
normal musket thereby increasing his chances of hitting the excavators of the American 
siege trench. 
1.6 CONCLUSION 
While I have attempted to give a brief overview of my thesis research in this 
introduction, it is also necessary to introduce the following chapters. In Chapter 2, I will 
discuss my theoretical perspective. Here I will offer a detailed look at agency, practice, 
and structure and their relation to archaeology. Chapter 3 will delve into the history of 
eighteenth century tactics within the larger history of the American Revolution. This 
background information is necessary to the understanding of my analysis of lead shot. 
Chapter 4 will provide a background history of Fort Motte and a detailed account of the 
siege. All previous archaeological work carried out at the site will be summarized in 
12 
 
Chapter 5. The methods for my thesis research will be discussed in Chapter 6. These 
include the methods of analysis of lead shot, field methods, and laboratory and curation 
procedures. In Chapter 7, I will describe the results of my research. I will give a detailed 
analysis of the lead shot at Fort Motte and compare this data to other Revolutionary 
War battles in South Carolina. Finally, my conclusion in Chapter 8 will give a 
comprehensive overview of the lead shot analysis at Fort Motte in relation to individual 
agency within the bounds of the cultural and technological changes during the 


















The theoretical perspective of my research builds on social theories regarding 
structure, habitus, and agency. Specifically, this thesis will take into account ideas put 
forth by Bourdieu, Giddens, and Ortner and will also take into consideration certain 
arguments from Foucault and Sahlins. I will then assess the practicability of utilizing 
agency theory to analyze the short-term behaviors of individuals within the larger 
context of structure. When studying an event such as a battle, one also needs to take 
into consideration other events that affected it because human agency is only visible at 
the event level, but it is affected by all other levels of time.  
I will discuss the applicability of ideas of agency, structure, and habitus to 
archaeological research. Additionally, it is my intention to discuss the validity of the 
aforementioned theories and ideas to the study of armed conflict specifically and to 
determine if there are certain aspects that would need to be modified in order to apply 
them to a study of conflict archaeology. I will focus on agency as an expression of 
intentional individual action within the larger structure of normative combat behavior.   
2.1 AGENCY THEORY 
Agency theory developed as a part of the post-processual movement in the late 
1970s and early 1980s and represented a reaction against “deterministic models of 
human action by acknowledging that people purposefully act and alter the external
14 
 
world through those actions” (Dornan 2002: 304). Specifically, agency theorists analyzed 
the goals of people as actors and asserted that “people are not uniform automatons” 
(Dornan 2002: 304). Within archaeology, agency theory has been utilized in several 
different ways. It has been used to theorize the individual (Hodder 2000), identity 
(Johnston 2005), power relationships (Ferguson 1992; Joyce 2000), rational action (Bell 
1992), intentionality (Bourdieu 1977; Hodder 2000; Johnson 1989), and unintended 
consequences (Giddens 1979; Johnson 1989; Pauketat 2001).  
In the 1970s and 1980s agency came to be understood as intentional action 
(Robb 2010). In this manner, individuals became more important. Similarly, Whitley 
(1998) and Robb (2010) stressed the importance of intentional human action. Humans 
were not simply reacting to environmental stimuli; they were active participants in life 
and in culture. However, agency was also understood to work within the larger cultural 
framework of structure; structure was both constraining and enabling to human agency 
(Bourdieu 1977; Giddens 1984; Robb 2010).  
2.2 THE INFLUENCE OF STRUCTURALISM 
It is necessary to explore the limitations of individual action. Pierre Bourdieu and 
Anthony Giddens have significantly contributed to the theorization of the individual 
within society (Dornan 2002; Robb 2010). Bourdieu and Giddens both “outline the 
dialectical relationship between ‘agent,’ a bounded but not determined individual who 
can alter structures through practice… and ‘structure,’ the larger, more perduring 
settings and conditions that result from the ongoing relationships between individuals” 
(Dornan 2002: 305). 
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Bourdieu developed ‘practice theory’ based on ideas of “human domination and 
resistance to accepted social patterns of inequality” (Dornan 2002). Practice theory 
looks at how the individual is affected by society and how the individual internalizes 
social practices. Bourdieu (1977) asserts that individual practices reproduce societal 
practices through habitus. Habitus (Bourdieu 1977) can be defined as the unconsciously 
or subconsciously recurring daily practices, objects, and associations that work to 
recreate certain aspects of social life. Habitus can also be understood as the repetition 
of certain social arrangements through time. 
Habitus is formed in the practice of every-day life in the interactions of social 
agents and the cultural structure of which they are a part. Habitus is the center of 
structured practice and makes up the basis of a society’s structural system. It can be 
defined as the cultural, social, and physical interactions of an agent since birth. It is 
assumed as normal. Habitus is historical and serves to reproduce historical practices. 
According to Bourdieu, essentially, nothing really new is ever produced; habitus 
maintains the historical status quo in different present-day manifestations.  
The limitations of habitus are “set by the historically and socially situated 
conditions of its production” out of certain cultural environments and contexts and 
conditions (Bourdieu 1974 and 1980: 447). Social agents are not entirely free, but 
neither are they completely controlled by structural institutions. Agents are free to do 




However, Bourdieu’s theory of practice does not take individual will or motive 
into account (Bourdieu 1990; Dornan 2002). Bourdieu holds that “human action is, on 
the whole unconscious” (Dornan 2002: 306). I argue that the situation at Fort Motte was 
far more complex, with individual motive and intention most certainly playing a part. It 
is constructive to recognize that much of human practice and action is carried out as a 
result of habit, and that intention and conscious action are not always utilized; however, 
it should be stressed that a person, at any given moment, is capable of intentional and 
conscious action.  
Giddens builds on Bourdieu’s theory of practice but he allows for a more 
involved individual; the individual is still limited by structure, but is also enabled by it 
(Giddens 1979; 1993). Individuals are seen to have a more active role in the construction 
of social structure. People are capable of intentional action; however, Giddens does not 
discuss individuals’ intentions beyond this capability (Dornan 2002). Giddens states 
succinctly that “every process of action is a production of something new, a fresh act; 
but at the same time all action exists in continuity with the past, which supplies the 
means of its initiation” (Giddens 1979: 70). Giddens’ theory of structuration asserts that 
“there is room in every instance of practice for creativity and innovation” (Dornan 2002: 
307). Giddens is interested in goal-oriented practice and states that “even the most 
enduring of habits… involves continual and detailed reflexive attention” (Giddens 1993: 
6). 
Foucault and Sahlins also influenced discussions of structure and agency. In his 
essay entitled ‘Power as knowledge,’ Michel Foucault (1976) offers a discussion of 
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power structures that aids in understanding the broader context of culture change over 
time. Power is the result of inequality and is always changing, unequal, and unstable. 
Foucault maintains that power “comes from below,” and holds that there are multiple 
forces of power at play in a given society at a given time (Foucault 1976: 474). This 
definition can be related to agency, both individual and collective, as it is expressed in 
resistance. Resistance is inevitable, and like power, it comes from a multitude of 
sources. Multiple variables exist, as well as multiple resistances and multiple agents. 
There is not a single form of domination or resistance. Likewise, the strategic tactics 
used within the system of power-knowledge are not uniform; there are several 
“possible tactics” and multiple possible paths of action (Foucault 1976: 477). 
Sahlins (1981: 67) states that “people act upon circumstances according to their 
own cultural presuppositions.” Cultural presuppositions can be understood both as a 
form of habitus and as an informal social structure. Sahlin’s discussion of structure does 
not align with what has been termed Saussurian structuralism, named after the 
pioneering work of de Saussure (1906-1911) with the structural formations of language. 
Sahlins discusses some of the problems of Saussurian structuralism: first, such a theory 
“privileged system over event” and second it “seemed also to exclude individual action 
and worldly practice” (Sahlins 1981: 3). To correct this, Sahlins specifically focuses on 
events but understands the larger context that led up to and will follow from the event. 
He comprehends that history and past cultural decisions play a large part in the idea of 
structure as it changes over time and stresses the need to study the “cultural relativity 
of the event and the responses to it” (Sahlins 1981: 68). In reaction to Saussurian 
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structuralism, Sahlins demonstrates that structure is dynamic; it is both transforming 
and transformed by social action. Like Giddens, he sees both social action and agency as 
intentional.  
2.3 A CLOSER LOOK AT AGENCY 
Giddens (1979), Ortner (2006a; 2006b), and Robb (2010) have all theorized ideas 
of agency within the realm of social theory. Ortner argues that all social life is 
intentional and that all actively played social life is goal-driven. She acknowledges that 
goals change over time but makes the important distinction between “routine 
practices,” which can be understood as habitus and “more intentionalized action” which 
she defines as agency (Ortner 2006b: 135). The agent is not completely free in his or her 
ability to make decisions and act accordingly. The agent is free only to an extent and is 
constrained by unequal power relations and competition, or societal structure. 
Therefore, agency is “always culturally constructed and maintained” (Ortner 2006b: 
139).  
All agents have the capacity to transform and be transformed. But certain 
limitations of agency exist. Time and power relations are both important variables 
governing agency (Giddens 1979: 55). Likewise, forms of power, such as dominance and 
resistance affect agency because they limit both what an agent can do and what an 
agent is more likely to do. Giddens states that “it is a necessary feature of action that, at 
any point in time, the agent ‘could have acted otherwise’ [sic]” (Giddens 1979: 56). 
Multiple variables and multiple possibilities increase the complexity of a social system. 
Similarly, Giddens understands agency as an intentional process. Giddens (1979) 
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stresses the importance of institutions and rules. He argues that people act according to 
certain rules, but this action feeds back into the rules. Certain conscious and 
unconscious social and cultural rules are accepted by agents and need to be understood 
in historical context; these rules can be evidenced in the behaviors and daily practices 
that they produce. These ideas express the interconnectedness of theories involving 
structure and agency. 
Robb (2010: 493) also understands agency as “a capacity for action.” Agency is 
contextual and depends on relationships. He states that it is “not a characteristic of 
individuals but of relationships” (Robb 2010: 494). Archaeologists need to understand 
the historical background and specific contextual situation of agency for proper 
interpretation. Agency is also inherently material because people use objects and 
objects effect people’s decisions. Therefore, a discussion of materiality is also necessary. 
Robb (2010) specifically discusses agency from the view point of archaeology. He 
acknowledges that agency has been a “notoriously ambiguous concept” (Robb 2010: 
493). However, it can also be very useful.  
Robb discusses past approaches to agency within archaeology in three thematic 
stages. The first trend formed around the basis that agency could be understood as 
intentional action (1970s and 1980s). Research at this time focused on the perspective 
of ambitious individuals seeking power. These past actions were seen to lead to the 
institutionalization of social hierarchy. In this way, agency was seen as “the individual’s 
ability to effect his or her will or intention” (Robb 2010: 496). However, Robb states that 
this view makes assumptions about human behavior: action is only analyzed in terms of 
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intentionality and it is assumed that some people are not motivated to seek power. 
Robb critiques this approach, asserting that it may work for an analysis of elites, but 
what about the rest of society? He argues that agency is not something possessed by 
individuals; rather, relationships are fundamentally important. The author states that 
“the intentional pursuit of goals is possible only through complicity with power 
structures, cultural ideas, [and] ways of behaving” (Robb 2010: 499). 
The second trend of agency in archaeology is that it came to be understood as 
dialectic (1990s). Agency was “not an individual’s ability to affect others; it is the dual, 
socially reproductive quality of action” (Robb 2010: 497). However, Robb states that this 
approach also makes assumptions. He asserts that people act within culturally specific 
social structures, but action is not limited by these structures. Additionally, actions can 
cause both intentional and unintentional modifications to structures and lead to social 
change. He addresses all of these factors as the “landscape of action” defined as the 
“set of possibilities and challenges formed by the past” (Robb 2010: 498). 
Agency needs to be understood within specific historical contexts or “fields of 
action” (Robb 2010: 499). Agency is best understood in terms of ‘projects’ through 
which goals are pursued. Agency develops from certain “shared understandings” that 
are contextually developed (Robb 2010: 500). Robb asserts that “in acting within a field 
of action, people act creatively, varying what they do to accomplish a proximate 
intention. Individual actions are often less embedded in habit, time and space; though 
often habitual, they are readily learnt and unlearnt” (Robb 2010: 501). How an 
individual carries out an action or task is very important because this is where individual 
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variation occurs. Robb states that “such variation encompasses many of the individual 
strategies of competition, emulation, innovation, redefinition, resistance and 
subversion” (Robb 2010: 501). 
The third change that Robb discusses is that agency came to be seen as 
relational (2000s). This approach deals with material agency, networks, and “the 
mutually constitutive relationships between agents and their material and social 
contexts” (Robb 2010: 502). Specifically, linking relationships are important because the 
capacity for action stems from participation in these relationships; the individual cannot 
act in isolation. Robb also discusses the possibility of collective agency. He gives the 
example of a soldier, saying that it is “really a collectivity which is acting through the 
individual hand” (Robb 2010: 503). However, just because a soldier has been trained to 
act collectively does not mean that the individual soldier will always do so. Robb goes on 
to state that “group behavior is usually a negotiated compromise which is shaped by 
both individual and group agendas but is reducible to neither” (Robb 2010: 503).  
The particular context of agency needs to be analyzed by looking at fields of 
action. A person decides why to act, the field of action determines how. Relationships 
between people and things are also important to an archaeological analysis involving 
agency as the production and use of an object depends on and recreates specific 
cultural relationships (Robb 2010: 513).  
2.4 AGENCY IN ARCHAEOLOGY  
Several archaeologists have utilized aspects of agency theory in their research 
(Bell 1992; Dobres 2000; Dornan 2002; Hodder 2000; Joyce 2000; Pauketat 2001; 
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Pauketat 2013; Shanks and Tilley 1987; Yarrow 2008). One researcher states that 
“within archaeology, the inclusion of the notion of agency has clearly expanded the 
analytical abilities of archaeology to address previously ignored aspects of the past” 
(Dornan 2002: 309). Below, I will briefly discuss some archaeological work involving 
agency theory that is related to my own research.  
Hodder (2000) stresses looking for creativity and intentionality over long periods 
of time. He “suggests that it is through an examination of individual lives in light of 
historically significant ‘dimensions of experience,’ that we can access and legitimately 
evaluate past human agentive actions” (Dornan 2002: 310). Specifically, he looks at how 
structure is evident within individual lives. Dornan (2002) asserts that this is problematic 
methodologically, however, as it is usually difficult to pick out a single individual from 
archaeological data, especially when one is attempting to analyze individual agency over 
a lifetime, as did Hodder (2000). 
Bell (1992: 39) also acknowledges the difficulty of ascertaining individual motives 
and intention due to the fact that “there are normally a wide variety of ideas and 
motives amongst individuals.” Therefore, Bell asserts that agency theory should be 
utilized only for human actions in situations where motives and ideas are generally 
similar (Bell 1992). In the majority of human action, it is difficult to determine what the 
normative action should be; however, a regulated military environment, for which there 
is written material documenting expected behavior, is an ideal situation to analyze 
intentional agentive action in the context of regulated practice. 
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Several authors (Dornan 2002; Pauketat 2001) support a move away from the 
idea that individuals should be the unit of study within agency theory. These authors 
support a primary focus on long-term structural changes. Pauketat’s (2001) ideas 
regarding the relation of agency and technology within the larger structure of society 
can relate to the analysis presented in this thesis. Cultural, technological, and behavioral 
changes are evident in the individual actions at Fort Motte. However, it should be 
stressed that this theoretical position needs to be utilized in addition to an 
understanding of agency theory that allows for conscious and intentional action.  
Dornan (2002) and Bell (1992) assert that much archaeological research involving 
agency only looks at the generic individual. They ask if it is even possible to identify a 
true individual. Methodological problems might arise in the analysis of the agency of an 
individual over a long period of time. However, it is much more reasonable to analyze 
individual agency within the realm of an event, specifically if the archaeological data are 
indicative of unique individual actions. Dornan (2002) and Johnson (2002) assert that 
the use of agency theory with a focus on individual intentionality is relatively rare within 
archaeology; most archaeologists utilizing agency theory focus on collective agency. 
However, Dornan (2002) suggests that a focus on the individual has potential. 
Since the 2000s, ideas of materiality have become more important (Robb 2010). 
Discussions of materiality stem from post-processual ideas such as agency. Materiality 
focuses on material culture and advocates close analysis of artifacts in order to discuss 
broader research topics ranging from gender to social and spatial organization. For 
many researchers, objects are seen as agents affecting cultural change as much as 
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people (Preucel and Meskell 2004). Joyce (2005: 151) discusses two more conservative 
opinions of material agency: Mauss (1992) stressed that material objects can be 
understood as “bodily extensions” and Hayles (1999) called objects “prostheses.” 
Similarly, Robb (2010) asserts that materials can be perceived to initiate action. He gives 
an example of a gun, stating that “it is neither the gun which kills somebody nor the 
person holding the gun, but rather the network of human plus gun – a network which 
includes the qualities of both” (Robb 2010: 505).  
Gell (1998: 16) argues that agents are seen as intentionally initiating action. 
However, materials can also be perceived to initiate action. Therefore, “agents are 
whoever or whatever people consider them to be, but it is always people rather than 
things which are doing the considering” (Robb 2010: 505). In this mode of thought, 
things are “secondary agents” (Gell 1998: 20). Several archaeologists (Gosden 2005; 
Gosden and Marshall 1999; Joy 2009) have considered the agency of objects. Gosden 
(2005: 193) specifically analyzes the ways in which things influence people and asserts 
that the form of an object “lays down certain rules of use” that impact human 
perceptions and actions. Gosden (2005) asserts that in this way, things cannot be 
thought of as passive. Joy (2009: 552) asserts that an artifact should be analyzed using a 
“relational approach” which stresses the interaction between the object and people. I 
assert that while material culture, such as firearms, certainly affects the choices of 
human agents, it cannot replace people as primary agents. 
Material culture has three possible meanings: structural (can be in several fields 
of action), generic (the specific field of action), and contextual (details specific to the 
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user of the object). Robb argues that the generic meaning of material culture has 
received little attention but is pivotal to the study of agency; “humans necessarily 
always act within a particular field of action” (Robb 2010: 507). Within these fields of 
action, individuals selectively utilize material culture and knowledge of technology and 
social structures to achieve specific goals. This will be discussed further in Chapter 8. 
2.5 AGENCY AT FORT MOTTE 
Following the above discussion of the various viewpoints concerning structure, 
practice, and agency, I would like to define these terms specifically for use in this thesis; 
below I provide my own definitions. ‘Structure’ is understood as the overarching cultural 
environment including normative social practices, technological and material entities, 
historical realities, as well as perceptions and ideologies regarding all of these. ‘Practice’ 
is defined as normative, habitual action. By ‘agency’ I mean goal-oriented, intentional, 
individual action. Agency may be based in habit and regular action, but it involves 
creative intention in the manner that it is carried out.  
Overall, many of the theories regarding agency, habitus, and structure 
mentioned above will work quite well in the interpretation and analysis of a 
Revolutionary War site, specifically Fort Motte. However, some minor modifications will 
need to be made. First, in addition to a daily-life habitus, militiamen and Continental 
soldiers would also have a modified military-life habitus. They were enlisted into a new 
culture, with its specific objects, practices, ideals, and language that, although not 
entirely different than those of daily-life, are diverse enough to warrant a more detailed 
analytical focus. In the process of their military experience, these individuals had to re-
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learn ways of acceptable socialization. Otterbein (2004) specifically advocates the close 
study of weapons as an individual learns to use weapons as a part of this socialization. 
Second, individual agency is limited by several things: environment, time, place, power 
relationships, habitus, and structure. Ultimately, all of these variables need to be 
understood together to give a more holistic understanding of a highly complex conflict 
such as the American Revolution.    
Otterbein (2004: 4) states that “the social and political organization of a people… 
spawns and maintains the military organization of a people.” Warfare is one of a 
society’s methods to intentionally pursue goals. Similarly, Scott and McFeaters (2011) 
assert that conflict is an aspect of larger culture or cultures. The authors view the 
combatants within a conflict as “a subcultural unit that mirrors the greater society’s 
cultural ideals, constraints, and orientation” (Scott and McFeaters 2011: 105). Individual 
action is seen as constrained, but also “patterned by the changing technologies of 
warfare that developed in the cultural and social context of the particular combatants” 
(Scott and McFeaters 2011: 107). 
Bleed and Scott (2011: 42) state that warfare “builds on the actions of 
individuals.” Persons, ideally, did not act in a way that was greatly in exception to the 
general cultural practices of the time. The ability to shoot a firearm was a skill that 
American colonists along the frontier and in the backcountry needed for hunting and 
protection on a daily basis. During the Revolution, this habitus would have been 
modified in the structure of certain behaviors. A soldier ideally fought within the 
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culturally acceptable structure of war and with certain fighting techniques that were 
socially imposed upon him.  
The material aspect of these actions can be seen in the archaeological remains at 
military sites. The individuals who participated in combat left behind “residues of their 
efforts” (Bleed and Scott 2011: 42). Bleed and Scott (2011) address the combined group 
dynamic and its representation in organized patterns of behavior visible in the 



















EIGHTEENTH CENTURY MILITARY CULTURE AND TACTICS 
In order to recognize both short-term and long-term structural changes present 
in the practice of military culture in the mid-eighteenth century, it is essential to have an 
understanding of military culture in the American colonies as well as Britain and other 
European countries in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. It is also 
necessary to understand the differences in the types of firearms in use at the time and 
their effects on the tactics utilized during the American Revolution. I will discuss tactical 
differences in the northern and southern colonies to further illustrate the structural 
conditions that were in place prior to the siege of Fort Motte.  
3.1 COLONIAL TACTICS 
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, European armies fought in set-piece 
battles using linear tactics (Becke 1909). These battles consisted of parallel lines of men 
facing off on open ground. These tactics persisted into the eighteenth century and will 
be discussed in more detail below. American colonists initially attempted to use linear 
tactics in their military encounters with Native Americans. However, European 
formations were not feasible in wooded terrain against an enemy that refused to fight 
in a similar manner. Life on the frontier and the environmental conditions in the 
American colonies caused a shift away from European linear warfare to irregular
29 
 
warfare. Irregular warfare included more fluid hunting tactics which were acquired 
during the wars against certain Native Americans living along the eastern coast. 
Malone (1991) discusses the influence of Native American tactics on New 
England colonists. Rather than fighting out in the open, Native American tribes “made 
the terrain and vegetation their allies” (Malone 1991: 21). Mobility and aimed fire were 
quintessential to Native warfare. Practice and years of experience were required to 
attain precision with the bow and later with firearms (Burke 1991). Native Americans 
used these weapons in a functionally similar manner.  
Malone (1991: 21) asserts that “the warriors retained more individual freedom 
of action than did soldiers in the disciplined ranks of a European army.” Native warriors 
specifically singled out an opponent and aimed their weapon at him. They held no 
reservations about aiming at officers and leaders, and frequently picked them out first. 
This was incredibly disturbing to the colonists, who considered this type of behavior 
“unsportsmanlike” (Malone 1991: 88). Colonists condemned these tactics as “devious 
‘skulking’ instead of real warfare” (Malone 1991: 23). One colonist (Gookin in Malone 
1991: 24) complained of Indians fighting “more like wolves than men.” 
The interaction with Native American tactics caused a shift in colonial tactics that 
led to “many departures from standard European military practices” (Malone 1991: 60). 
In the forest environment of New England, fighting against an opponent that refused to 
fight in pitched battle, colonists were forced to adapt their own method of warfare 
despite their original contempt for irregular tactics and aiming (Malone 1991). Malone 
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(1991) asserts that a modification in tactics had occurred by 1676; colonists began to 
use terrain and vegetation for cover, aim at specific targets, and utilize loose formations. 
The American colonists on the western frontier developed into the American 
“back-woodsman” (Hanger 1814: 190). The average American frontiersman can be 
contrasted with the English layman. In England, “hunting was the sport of the upper 
classes” (Malone 1991: 52); commoners were outlawed from hunting. Additionally, 
hunting with firearms was not especially popular, regardless of class. Firearm usage was 
generally restricted to militia training or military campaign. However, in the colonies, 
skill with a firearm was a necessity, both for food and protection. Greene (1973: 59-60) 
states that the “wilderness conditions and later the lack of many of the traditional 
restraints and supportive social institutions that the colonists had had in England had 
early forced men to rely heavily upon their own resources” (Greene 1973: 59-60). The 
American colonist usually only had one firearm that functioned for both military and 
civilian uses. On the frontier, this firearm was most often a rifle. 
Like the influence of native tactics, the development of the American rifle in 
early eighteenth century would cause continued changes in colonial tactics in America. 
By the time of the Revolution, the American backwoodsman was associated with the 
rifle; he was a natural marksman because of his environment (Hanger 1814; Plaster 
2009). He was practiced at aiming and knew distances. American riflemen would “act at 
such loose order, as to imitate the subtle art of the Indian, who endeavours [sic] always 




Despite the association of the American backwoodsman with the rifle, the 
flintlock musket was the standard weapon of the colonial militia in long-settled areas 
such as New England (Malone 1991). The colonists “were still restricted by allegiance to 
cultural traditions and to standard military practices of their age” (Malone 1991: 66). 
These cultural traditions and standards were largely set by Britain. American colonists 
fought alongside the British against the French and their native allies during the French 
and Indian War (1754-1763). In this conflict, American colonists utilized both linear and 
irregular warfare. However, European stress on linear warfare led to American military 
ideals that favored European tactics. By the American Revolution, there was a major 
shift in colonial tactics back to linear warfare. This shift in tactical ideals will be discussed 
further below. 
3.2 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY FIREARMS  
The Flintlock Musket 
The conventional firearms of the eighteenth century were flintlocks that loaded 
from the muzzle and used black powder. Two primary firearms were in employed during 
the American Revolution: the musket and the rifle. The flintlock musket was a 
smoothbore firearm. It was quick to load because the musket ball fit loosely in the 
barrel. For example, a .75 caliber British musket fired a ball about .690” in diameter 
from a barrel .750” in diameter. The difference between the caliber (the diameter of the 
bore) and the diameter of the ball is called windage.  
Musket balls were generally used with paper cartridges that included a “pre-
measured charge of black powder” (Sivilich 2007: 84). In such cartridges, the ball and 
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powder charge were rolled together in a sealed paper tube. To load a musket, a soldier 
would tear the tip of the cartridge open and pour a small amount of powder into the 
pan. Then he would pour the remaining powder into the muzzle of the musket, drop the 
lead shot down the barrel, and use the ramrod to ensure everything was firmly within 
the barrel. The soldier would then present his musket, point it in the general direction of 
the enemy, pull back the hammer, and fire.  
When fired, the musket ball struck the inside of the barrel and being ejected, 
glanced off in the general direction of fire. This allowed for only moderate accuracy. 
Eighteenth century muskets were relatively accurate at close range between 50-80 
yards (Babits 2002; Hanger 1814; Moore 1967). Beyond that, however, accuracy was out 
of the question. One witness of a musket’s accuracy observed that “as to firing at a man 
at 200 yards with a common musket, you may just as well fire at the moon and have the 
same hopes of hitting your object” (Hanger 1814: 205). Despite their inaccuracy, 
flintlock muskets were the standard military weapon because of their rate of fire; 
muskets could fire up to four times in a minute (Plaster 2009). As will be discussed 
below, rapidity of fire was highly prized in linear warfare.  
At the time of the American Revolution, European weapons trended toward 
standardization. In Britain, “the Government standard for military flintlocks was quite 
high” (Miller 1978). The British “Ordnance system of manufacture” began in 1715 
(Bailey 1971: 9) and the British standardized musket, which later came to be commonly 
known as the ‘Brown Bess,’ was produced beginning in the 1720s. This system allowed 
the Board of Ordnance to closely supervise and inspect parts that were contracted out 
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(Bailey 1971). The Board of Ordnance provided patterns of parts that were made by 
type: barrels, locks, etc. 
During the mid-eighteenth century, two patterns were used. These were the 
Long Land Pattern and the Short Land Pattern (Bailey 1971).  These patterns produced 
the English Long Land Pattern musket and English Short Land Pattern musket, 
respectively.  The difference was in barrel length. Both Land patterns, and other British 
muskets manufactured between the 1720s and the 1830s, were all .75 caliber muskets 
(Moore 1967: 61). British muskets were all “of fairly uniform caliber” (Peterson 2000: 
164). The British issued these .75 caliber smoothbore flintlock muskets to the regular 
British infantry.  
In France, a system of firearm standardization was also in use. The French 
Charleville musket was produced on a large scale.  Moore (1967: 63) discusses the fact 
that “Charleville is a generic term often used to designate eighteenth-century French 
military muskets” (Moore 1967: 63). These firearms have been named after one of the 
arsenals where the muskets were produced. In reality, the firearms were actually 
manufactured at several French arsenals for government issue (Moore 1967). All of 
these weapons were standardized .69 caliber smoothbore flintlock muskets. 
Along with the creation of standardized muskets, European nations also 
developed standardized ammunition.  Jorgensen (2005: 57-8) states that “by 1738 every 
nation had issued their infantry with cartridges.” Because of the standardization of 
British and French muskets, these nations were able to mass produce quantities of lead 
shot. Stephenson (2007: 138) cites the use of “Gang molds,” which could produce 
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multiple musket balls at once. Lead shot was manufactured by pouring molten lead/lead 
alloy into a two-part mold. The lead was allowed to cool, and then it was removed. The 
sprue, or bit of lead attached to the ball due to the molding process, was cut off along 
with any ‘flashing’ around the mold seam (Sivilich 2007: 84). These musket balls were 
quite standardized in size, weight, and lead composition based on the nation for which 
they were produced. Thus, eighteenth century spherical lead shot can be said to exhibit 
a certain amount of cultural distinctiveness. 
During the American Revolution, Charlevilles were imported from France and 
distributed to the Continental Army. The majority of firearms used by American forces 
after 1777 were French; “in 1776 and 1777 American commissioners procured over 
100,000 obsolete muskets” (Madaus 1981: 50). American forces certainly used British 
muskets if they were available; but they generally had greater access to the French 
Charleville muskets (Peterson 2000: 176). Early in the War, American forces also used 
American reproductions of British muskets. These guns may have had greater variation 
as to caliber; however, they still would have been relatively uniform and very close to 
.75 caliber.   
Other smoothbore firearms such as carbines, fusils, and pistols of several calibers 
were also in action during the Revolution (Peterson 2000: 209-212). Carbines were 
shoulder arms with a shorter barrel than either rifles or muskets. They were ideal for 
mounted men and were utilized by cavalry, dragoons, and artillerymen (Moore 1967: 
65). The 1764 standard British carbine was about .66 caliber (Peterson 2000: 170). 
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Additionally, not all muskets were produced for military use; some were also 
produced for trade. Trade guns, as these firearms came to be called, were made 
specifically for trade with Native Americans “according to standards calculated to satisfy 
the wishes and requirements of the intended Indian consumers” (Burke 1991: 3). Trade 
guns were light weight, smaller caliber smoothbore flintlock muskets. They too were 
relatively standardized, as they were produced by several different gunmakers 
“according to an established pattern” (Burke 1991).  
The Rifle 
Unlike the musket, which was developed primarily for military use, the rifle was 
produced for hunting. Rifles were handcrafted and were far from standardized 
(Lagemann and Manucy 1993; Peterson 2000). Riflemen cast their own shot in individual 
molds suited to the exact caliber of their weapon (Stephenson 2007). 
The technology of rifling stems from German gunsmiths. Rifling can be defined 
as a set of spiral grooves that is cut into the bore of a gun. Rifles usually had seven 
grooves (Moore 1967). The raised areas between the grooves were called lands (Figure 
3.1). The lands would actually cut into the surface of the lead ball as it was fired. Rifling 
created a spin on the fired projectile and increased stability in flight and accuracy (Hagie 
1946; Madaus 1981). Moore (1967) states that the grooves gave the projectile a three-
quarter turn in the barrel. However, several authors (Hanger 1814: Lagemann and 
Manucy 1993) describe the grooves as giving one full turn in the barrel.  
The Jaeger rifle was produced for hunting in the forests of Germany and Austria; 
however, this type of firearm was also used in a military context. Jaeger riflemen were 
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not very common as the skillful use of a rifle required much practice and training over 
time (Hanger 1814). In European military action, these riflemen utilized different tactics 
than eighteenth century musketeers. Hanger (1814) discussed “Hessian and Hanoverian 
jagers” participation in the Seven Years’ War. The Jaegers fired from the woods, using 
natural vegetation as cover. Hanger (1814) explicitly noted the exceptional 
marksmanship of these riflemen. The fact that these men aimed at specific individuals 
with such lethal accuracy led to extreme reprisal by the opposing force. This type of 
fighting behavior was seen as unnatural. Hanger (1814: 130) remarked that  “the French 
were so incensed that day, against the jagers, that a few of them which they took, 
wounded, in the retreat, for the German forces were beaten, they buried up to their 
chins in the ground, and left them to die.”  
 
 
       Figure 3.1 Sketch of bore and rifling (Moore 1967: 56) 
 
German gunsmiths brought a tradition of hunting with rifles with them when 
they settled in Pennsylvania at the beginning of the eighteenth century (Lagemann and 
Manucy 1993; Madaus 1981; Moore 1967). However, rifles were adapted to the needs 
of American colonists (Lagemann and Manucy 1993; Madaus 1981; Moore 1967). 
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Adaptations were almost universal in the colonies by 1775 (Lagemann and Manucy 
1993). These adaptations created a rifle that was quite different from the original Jaeger 
rifle (Figure 3.2). This colonial firearm came to be known as the American Rifle, Long 
Rifle, or Pennsylvania Rifle. 
Changes included a lengthened barrel (Lagemann and Manucy 1993) and a 
smaller bore (Moore 1967; Plaster 2009). The Jaeger rifle was larger than .60 cal. as 
compared to the .35 - .60 cal. American rifle (Plaster 2009). The American rifle also took 
less powder, less lead, and was more efficient; its lightweight and fast projectile was 
more accurate whereas the Jaeger rifle ball was heavier and slower. 
Table 3.1 Differences between the Jaeger   
and the American Long Rifle (Lagemann  
and Manucy 1993: 6) 
 
  
A key element in loading the rifle was patching, or wrapping the projectile in a 
piece of greased linen. Patching allowed for a slight decrease in the diameter of the ball, 
which made it easier to load lead shot into the muzzle while still maintaining a tight fit 
within the bore (Lagemann and Manucy 1993; Madaus 1981). Patching also quieted the 




An American rifle took much longer to load than a smoothbore musket; it could 
take up to two minutes to load, aim, and fire (Plaster 2009). To load the rifle, one would 
measure and load “with powder first; then put a ball on the mouth of the rifle with a 
greased patch, so that the ball may go down tolerably tight, and fit well in the grooves, 
as a ball should do in a rifle-gun” (Hanger 1814: 133). 
Jaeger rifles were accurate up to 200 yards (Plaster 2009). American rifles were 
accurate between 200-400 yards (Moore 1967). Exceptional shots were noted at the 
maximum range. One of these, a 400 yard shot during the American Revolution, was 
documented by Hanger (1814). He observed an American rifleman shoot a horse out 
from under an orderly directly behind himself and General Tarleton. Based on his 
experience in the American colonies, Hanger (1814: 122) stated that “I never in my life 
saw better rifles (or men who shot better) than those made in America.” Grancsay 
(1967: vi) asserts that “the Pennsylvania Rifle’s principal value was that most of the men 
who used it were trained marksmen. In Europe, since only the privileged could hunt, 
there were comparatively few marksmen, but in America the entire country was a 
hunting ground, and a man’s life often depended on his ability to shoot accurately.”  
The American rifle developed as a hunting weapon to cope with specific 
conditions on the frontier; however, at the time of the Revolution there had developed 
“an entirely new set of conditions which called for a return to European tactics” 
(Peterson 2000: 156). While rifles were still favored for their use in hunting along the 
frontier and in the colonial backcountry, muskets became the standard military arm of 




3.3 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY MILITARY CULTURE 
Rules of Warfare 
“By 1715 most European states were maintaining large standing forces” 
(Jorgensen 2005: 46); professional armies were the norm by the mid-eighteenth 
century. These armies required training and discipline. Therefore, strict standards were 
maintained. The eighteenth century was a time of increased writing and study regarding 
warfare and tactics. At this time there were several attempts to create certain rules for 
warfare (Luvaas 1979; Puysegur 1748; Vauban 1740); military practice was largely based 
on these rules (Becke 1909; Luvaas 1979). Battles were “set, conventional pieces” 
(Becke 1909: 4). Armies “played the game according to certain rules, and when they lost 
according to the accepted rule they submitted as gracefully as they could” (Becke 1909: 
3). Becke (1909) gave examples of several typical or conventional battles and discussed 
European tactics in the Seven Years’ War. The primary rule of European warfare in the 
eighteenth century was that “soldiers fought opponents who were willing to accept 
battle under mutually advantageous situations” (Malone 1991: 32).  
European tactics of the eighteenth century were linear, in which the main action 
was between infantry. The formation of an army was aligned to face the front of the 
enemy’s formation, creating parallel lines of opposing forces. Opposing lines usually 
faced off within 40-100 yards of each other (Stephenson 2007). Therefore, most armies 
favored muskets, as at that range, such firearms would be relatively effective against 
tight line formations. Madaus (1981: 13) describes linear formations as “lines of soldiers, 
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two ranks deep, standing shoulder to shoulder to permit effective volley fire.” There 
were typically two lines, each three ranks deep (Becke 1909). The first line engaged the 
enemy while the second line was held in reserve. Ranks fired successively: so that “the 
rank that fired first should be once more ready to fire by the time all the other ranks had 
emptied their muskets” (Becke 1909: 3). Each soldier fired three to four shots per 
minute. The goal was to “keep up an almost incessant fire” (Becke 1909: 9). 
Volley fire from the line was to be the decisive factor in battle; “the idea was to 
bring about the destruction of an enemy by a single smashing blow that destroyed all in 
front of it, and tore the very heart out of the enemy’s further power of resistance” 
(Becke 1909: 12). It was military practice to fire two or three volleys before engaging the 
enemy with bayonets (Moore 1967).  
Peterson asserts that, in this type of warfare, “rapidity of fire was prized much 
more highly than accuracy” (Peterson 2000: 163). Aiming was not of primary 
importance. Becke (1909: 8) describes musket volleys as “unaimed fire.” Aiming was 
only conducted in a general sense; for example, Hanger (1814: 201) states that soldiers 
in the line were ordered “to aim where they perceive the enemy to stand the thickest 
[sic] in numbers.” He goes on to assert that “NO MAN WAS EVER KILLED, AT TWO 
HUNDRED YARDS [sic], by a common soldier’s musket, BY THE PERSON WHO AIMED AT 
HIM [sic]” (Hanger 1814: 205). 
Cavalry and artillery were also utilized in linear warfare. The cavalry was 
generally held in reserve and used for flanking maneuvers. The artillery functioned to 
slow the infantry’s advance using grape or canister shot. Skirmishers also had a place in 
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linear warfare. Becke (1909) states that there was mention of these light troops from 
1745 on. However, the primary force on the field of battle was the infantry.  
The Militia System 
Colonial militias were based on the English militia system which “required that 
each citizen arm himself at his own expense with a suitable military weapon” (Madaus 
1981: 12). The English system preferred the militia to be armed with muskets. Rifles 
were not generally used in England prior to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century. Even then, they were used mostly by the upper classes. Therefore, many of the 
mandates regarding colonial militias gave preference to the use of the musket. 
In his discussion of the colonial militia system, historian Michael Stephenson 
(2007: 6-19) appraised the cost of an eighteenth century firearm to be approximately 
two weeks’ wages. Not every individual could afford a firearm, specifically if it was not 
needed on a daily basis. Individuals who lived along the frontier and in the backcountry 
regularly utilized firearms; however, increasing settlement, urbanization, and cultivation 
in the older colonies led to a decreasing reliance on the firearm for anything other than 
militia use (Stephenson 2007). 
 Militias met several times during the year to train, usually once a month. 
However, there was no real instruction in aiming or accuracy; most time was spent 
training men to properly load and fire a musket (Malone 1991). The militia consisted of 
men between the ages of sixteen and sixty. Exemptions existed for estate holders and 
others; therefore the militia was drawn from the lower orders of the white, male, and 
property-holding population (Stephenson 2007). 
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3.4 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 
The Revolutionary War was caused by structural changes in the American 
colonies (Greene 1973). Due to rapid population growth in the colonies, British policy 
became increasingly difficult to carry out; governors and other British officials lacked the 
force necessary to implement many imperial instructions (Greene 1973). Additionally, 
the majority of the colonial male population (60-90%) regularly participated in local 
politics (Greene 1973: 38). This led to considerable autonomy. Economic development 
in the American colonies after 1750 in addition to Britain’s mounting debts after the 
Seven Years’ War motivated the British government to take strong positions. Between 
1759 and 1776 British policies were designed to keep the colonies firmly under control. 
However, these policies were seen as oppressive by many of the colonists and led to a 
demand for independence.  
Despite calls for independence from the political tyranny of Britain, the colonies 
continued to depend on Britain for “normative standards” (Greene 1973: 60). Military 
practice was no exception. During the French and Indian War (1756-1763), American 
militiamen fought alongside the British and became indoctrinated in linear warfare once 
again. Therefore, in 1776 at the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, American military 
leaders based their field tactics on those of their former sovereign nation. A study of 
Revolutionary War battles (Moore 1967: 59) shows that the majority were fought “in 
the accepted European fashion, with the men standing in close ranks and firing volleys.”  
In terms of military strategy and policy, the Americans endeavored to fight the 
British on equal terms. The American colonies attempted to form a fighting force that 
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could stand against the discipline and regimentation of the British army. The Continental 
Army was strongly influenced by European military standards and was the most 
disciplined and trained force originating from the American states during the 
Revolution. “Washington did everything in his power to fight the war on European lines” 
(Stephenson 2007: xxii). Therefore, the Continentals were trained in corporate linear 
tactics. As a result, all of the major American victories of the Revolution were fought 
according to linear tactics in set piece battles. 
Riflemen 
British forces were armed almost exclusively with muskets. However, the British 
also hired Hessian jaeger riflemen (Grancsay 1967). Rifles utilized by these individuals 
would have been similar to the German rifles mentioned earlier. The British also hired 
Hessian infantrymen armed with smoothbore muskets (Plaster 2009). Thus, it would be 
imprudent to analyze all Hessian troops as riflemen as the vast majority were armed 
with muskets.  
As the British favored the musket, so did the Americans. Therefore, American 
“riflemen did not fit the standardized mold of a national army” (Stephenson 2007: 133). 
Riflemen were seen as unpredictable and undisciplined. However, the use of riflemen in 
battle changed over the course of the war and was largely based on regional 
differences. During the Revolution, muskets were utilized more heavily in New England 




Although valuable in certain circumstances, rifles were seen as a secondary and 
often unwanted weapon on the battlefield. Riflemen were used as flankers and 
sharpshooters (Moore 1967). These “riflemen-sharpshooters” never exceeded five 
percent of the Continental army (Plaster 2009: 41); however, there existed several 
American companies made up solely of riflemen (Moore 1967; Plaster 2009). In these 
companies, “individual marksmanship was prized and volley fire disdained” (Bruce 2009: 
9). Twelve such companies were formed in Boston in June 1775 (Plaster 2009). Initially 
these companies were successful; however they were disbanded after eight months. 
While a few riflemen were maintained as scouts, most were transferred to smoothbore-
musket regiments. 
The weakness of rifle companies was a result of their deployment in linear 
warfare; rifles did not come equipped with bayonets and “the bayonet often decided 
the battle outcome” (Lagemann and Manucy 1993: 25). Bruce (2009: 9) succinctly 
describes the tactic of a bayonet charge “after the enemy had been well softened by 
musketry.” When riflemen were deployed to fight against British companies armed with 
bayonets, without reinforcement from their own bayonet-wielding musketeers, the 
riflemen were easily overrun. While riflemen were armed with hunting knives and 
tomahawks for hand-to-hand fighting, “these lacked the reach of a bayonet-tipped 
musket” (Bruce 2009: 9). In the time it took to load, aim, and fire a rifle, the 
smoothbore-armed enemy would have time to fire up to eight volleys before charging 
with bayonets (Plaster 2009). Hanger (1814) described such an action involving 
Morgan’s riflemen in America. He stated that Colonel Abercromby “ordered his troops 
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to charge them with the bayonet; not one man of them, out of four, had time to fire, 
and those who did, had no time given them to load again” (Hanger 1814: 200). 
Therefore, the problem was not with the rifle, but with the use of the rifle. In 
1776 and 1777, the Provincial Congress again called for the creation of a separate rifle 
regiment (Bass 1959: 15; Plaster 2009: 41). Colonel Daniel Morgan’s rifle regiment was 
very successful against Burgoyne’s army by sniping and utilizing irregular tactics. 
Generally, however, the Continental Army was rather disenchanted with the rifle 
on the field of battle.  Many American military leaders discouraged riflemen from joining 
the regular line (Peterson 2000: 200). Additionally, there was a negative British image of 
the American rifleman. British soldiers showed no mercy to riflemen who were not 
armed with bayonets. Thus, to go into battle armed only with a rifle was deemed to be a 
very risky decision, a risk many officers were unwilling to take.  
Riflemen were useful in certain circumstances, but according to Peterson, rifles 
“had little effect on the overall arms picture” (Peterson 2000: 156). This was certainly 
true of the conflict in the northern colonies. In the southern campaign, however, 
riflemen played a larger role. American officers such as Francis Marion and Thomas 
Sumter utilized riflemen regularly in military engagements. 
3.5 THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR IN SOUTH CAROLINA  
As the fighting in the north reached a stalemate, the War “shifted south” (Plaster 
2009) in 1780 with the British siege of Charleston, South Carolina. Bass (1959: 114) 
argues that “the operations in the Carolinas were almost a separate war.” In the south, 
battles continued to be fought using linear tactics. However, partisan warfare was also 
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being conducted (Bruce 2009; Smith 2010; Stephenson 2007). Partisan warfare 
consisted of ambush and hit-and-run tactics. The partisans were significantly 
outnumbered by British forces. Therefore, they attempted to isolate and overwhelm the 
opposition by stealth, specifically targeting supply routes. These tactics were influenced 
by the Native Americans’ ‘skulking way of war’ (Malone 1991; Stephenson 2007). 
Generally, it was the militia that conducted partisan warfare as the Continentals almost 
exclusively employed linear tactics.  
South Carolina partisan leader Francis Marion was known for his quick attacks 
and retreats (Smith 2010). Marion targeted strategic positions such as bridges and river 
crossings, and used the terrain, specifically the swamps of South Carolina, to his 
advantage. Marion’s base camp was on Snow’s Island, hidden in the swamps (Rankin 
1973; Smith 2010). Marion’s men could attack and quickly retreat back into the 
wetlands, where the British were unlikely to follow. If the British did follow, they could 
be easily picked off as they were unable to use linear formations in the dense swamp 
vegetation. Additionally, Marion’s militiamen were all mounted, which increased their 
success with partisan tactics (Smith et al. 2007). 
Rifles were especially useful in partisan warfare. Colonel Watson (Watson in Bass 
1959: 155), after crossing the Sampit, wrote of Marion and his riflemen, “They will not 
sleep and fight like gentlemen… but like savages are eternally firing and whooping 
around us by night, and by day waylaying and popping at us from behind every tree!” 
At the battle at Williamson’s Plantation, popularly known as the Battle of Huck’s 
Defeat on July 12, 1780, American riflemen made use of trees and fences as natural 
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cover for their advance. This allowed them time to take careful aim at their opponents 
(Scoggins et al. 2011). Likewise, at King’s Mountain on Oct. 7, 1780, sixteen hundred 
American riflemen defeated British provincial troops (Bass 1959; Lagemann and Manucy 
1993; Plaster 2009). Tactics here included sniping, loose formations, and can be 
understood as irregular warfare. The partisans used similar tactics at the skirmish at 
Wadboo Plantation which occurred on August 29, 1782. American riflemen used trees 
and other large objects to protect themselves from direct fire while taking time to aim 
and pick off individual opponents (Smith et al. 2008). 
The majority of the military leaders in South Carolina continued to fight in set 
battles according to the linear tactics of the time. However, at the Battle of Cowpens on 
January 17, 1781 General Daniel Morgan successfully integrated “accurate rifle fire and 
smoothbore musket volleys” (Plaster 2009). He ordered the militia to fire twice and then 
fall back as the British charged with bayonets. The Continentals were then ordered to 
come forward and fire in volleys into the charging line.  
South Carolina partisan leader Francis Marion was constantly frustrated by the 
militia and viewed them as unreliable (Smith et al. 2007). Under South Carolina law the 
militia was required to only serve thirty days when called up (Bass 1959). However, 
Marion remarked of the militiamen in a letter to Gates (Marion in Bass 1959: 98) that “I 
seldom have the same set a fortnight.” Nathanael Greene praised the officers of the 
South Carolina militia, but complained that “the people with them just come and go as 
they please” (Greene in Bass 1959: 175). 
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Marion had several riflemen under his command at various times during the 
Revolution, as is evident from historical sources as well as archaeological evidence 
(Ferguson 1973; Scoggins et al. 2011; Smith et al. 2007; Smith et al. 2008). Because of 
the transitory nature of the militia, Marion is thought to have maintained several skilled 
riflemen throughout the war, men whose skill and loyalty were assured.   
McCottry’s Riflemen served under Francis Marion and were designated as 
“sharpshooters” (Bass 1959: 148) and “crack shots” (Bass 1959: 177). Captain William 
McCottry himself was “credited with killing an enemy officer at 300 yards” (Plaster 
2009: 76-7). McCottry’s riflemen also played a pivotal role in the siege of Fort Watson 
(Ferguson 1973; Ferguson 1977).  
These men cut off the British access to their water supply and were essential to 
the American victory at this battle. Fort Watson was constructed atop the Santee Indian 
mound and stood at least thirty feet higher than the surrounding ground (Lee 1869). 
Therefore, the attacking American forces built what is now known as “Maham’s tower” 
(Ferguson 1973: 6) to give them the advantage. Three or four riflemen climbed into the 
tower and were able to fire down into the fort (Ferguson 1973; Ferguson 1977; Lee 
1869; MacKay 1781). In his journal, Mackay described this event, writing that “in the 
Afternoon brought down a Wooden Machine which they had built… for their Marksmen 
to pick off our Centinels” (Mackay 1781 quoted in Ferguson 1973: 44). The riflemen, 
“having thorough command of every part of the fort” (Lee 1869: 332) forced the British 
to surrender.  
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A Sergeant McDonald7 was also a noted rifleman sharpshooter associated with 
Marion. In March 1781, “Red-headed Sergeant McDonald set a mark for the snipers. 
Climbing unperceived into one of the large oaks that lined the avenue to Witherspoon’s 
house, at three hundred yards he put a rifle ball through the knee of Lieutenant George 
Torriano of the Guards” (Bass 1959: 150). He was also commended for brave action at 
Spring Hill and Georgetown (Bass 1959). As will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 8, 
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HISTORY OF FORT MOTTE 
4.1 THE MOUNT JOSEPH PLANTATION 
Prior to the construction of Fort Motte, the site was part of the Mount Joseph 
Plantation located in Amelia Township along the Congaree River. In the mid-eighteenth 
century this area was considered to be part of South Carolina’s backcountry. The Mount 
Joseph Plantation property was owned by Rebecca Motte (Figure 4.1) at the time of the 
siege. Born Rebecca Brewton (June 15, 1737-January 10, 1815), she was the daughter of 
a wealthy and influential Charleston family. She married Jacob Motte on June 11, 1758 
(Edgar and Bailey 1974:480-481). The couple openly supported the patriot cause 
(Helsley 2009: 115). Jacob was actively involved in colonial politics, and later served in 
the First, Second, and Third General Assemblies (Edgar and Bailey 1974: 480-481; Smith 
et al. 2007: 12). Jacob died in 1780.  
Considerably wealthy in her own right, Rebecca Motte inherited the Mount 
Joseph Plantation from her brother, Miles Brewton, in 1775 (Helsley 2009: 114). 
Brewton lived in Charleston, but owned several plantations in the South Carolina 
backcountry including Mount Joseph. A Loyalist, he was very active in South Carolina 
politics; from 1763-1772 he served as a member of the Commons House of Assembly 
and in 1775 was also elected to the First and Second Provincial Congress (Edgar and
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Bailey 1974: 96-97; Smith et al. 2007). However, while traveling to Philadelphia in 1775, 
he and his immediate family perished at sea (Edgar and Bailey 1974: 97). 
 
            Figure 4.1 Mrs. Rebecca Motte (Lossing  
        [1860]2004: 150) 
 
The Mount Joseph Plantation was possibly used for stock-ranging or growing 
indigo (Smith et al. 2007: 14). Rebecca constructed a large two or three story house on 
the property. Lieutenant Colonel Henry Lee (Lee 1998: 345) described the Motte home 
as a “large, new mansion-house” indicating that the home was newly constructed. 
Additionally, a smaller structure was located on the adjacent ridge to the north, 
variously called an ‘overseers house’ (James 1821: 120), a ‘log cabin’ (Bass 1959: 189), 
and a ‘farm house’ (Lossing 1860[2004]: 150).  
At the time of the British occupation, Rebecca Motte and two unmarried 
daughters were present at the Plantation. “The British made it a practice of seizing the 
home of the most prominent local rebel as a means of subduing the surrounding local 
population” (Smith et al. 2007: 15). Rebecca was a devoted supporter of the American 
52 
 
cause and “supplied South Carolina’s soldiers with rice, beef, pork, corn, and fodder” 
(Helsley 2009: 115; Smith et al. 2007). The British had previously occupied and fortified 
the nearby Belleville Plantation home between November 1780 and February 1781.8 
However, early in 1781 they abandoned this post and moved all men and supplies to the 
newly constructed Fort Motte on the Mount Joseph Plantation (Sumter in Conrad et al. 
1995: 67). 
4.2 FORT MOTTE 
Fort Motte was constructed around the Mount Joseph Plantation mansion 
between January and April of 1781 (Smith et al. 2007: 18). It consisted of a moat and 
palisade surrounding Rebecca Motte’s two or three story plantation house (Figures 4.2 
and 4.3). The wooden palisade stood approximately nine feet high and was constructed 
within a few feet of the house (Conrad et al. 1995; Smith et al. 2007). This palisade 
would have protected the first two stories. “Earthen fortifications” (Smith et al. 2007: 
21) included a ditch (moat) six feet deep and an earthen rampart approximately 10 feet 
wide, which was constructed with dirt from the excavated ditch. In addition, a row of 
abatis, intended to break up an enemy charge, was also placed within thirty yards of the 
palisade. As this was a relatively small fort, the majority of the British and Hessian 
troops occupying the post would have camped outside the walls. The well was dug 
outside the walls as well (Sumter in Conrad et al. 1995: 193). 
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 It is uncertain why the British did not initially occupy and fortify the Mount Joseph Plantation, as it was 
located in a more strategic and defensible position than Belleville. However, Elizabeth Motte Pinckney 
(Pinckney 1780; Smith et al. 2007: 15-17) describes a smallpox outbreak which affected members of the 
Motte household and neighboring plantations. This may have been the determining factor for the 




          Figure 4.2 American engineer’s drawing of Fort  




Figure 4.3 American engineer’s drawing of Fort Motte,  
profile view (modified from Conrad et al. 1995: 252) 
 
The Mount Joseph Plantation home was a located in a strategic position on a 
bluff overlooking the Congaree River near McCord’s Ferry (Bass 1959). At the beginning 
of 1781, the British controlled the majority of towns in the South Carolina backcountry 
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as well as the supply routes that connected them to Charleston. Fort Motte was used as 
a British outpost, part of the line of forts which provided protection to the main supply 
route between Charleston and other backcountry outposts such as Camden (Ferguson 
1977). In 1781, Fort Motte was the primary British station west of the Congaree (Smith 
et al. 2007). 
The War of Posts 
The Americans had great success at the Battle of Cowpens in January 1781.9 
After Cowpens, the main British field army, under Cornwallis, chased General Nathanael 
Greene into North Carolina, but both commanders soon returned to South Carolina.  On 
March 15, 1781, the British, under Cornwallis, won a victory at Guilford Court House; 
however, they suffered severe casualties. The battle at Guilford Courthouse was fought 
as “a classic set-piece 18th [sic] century battle” (Smith et al. 2007: 18). After the battle, 
Cornwallis retreated into North Carolina and Virginia and Greene turned toward Colonel 
Francis Lord Rawdon at Camden. In the spring of 1781, Rawdon commanded the British 
field forces in South Carolina while Greene commanded the American forces in the 
Carolinas (Pancake 1985). American forces were beginning to turn the tide of the war in 
South Carolina; however, the British still occupied the major towns in South Carolina 
and maintained strong posts to protect their supply routes from Charleston.  
At this time, Greene ordered Brigadier General Francis Marion (Figure 4.4) and 
Colonel Henry Lee (Figure 4.5) to join forces and attack the British posts near Camden 
(James 1821). In a letter to Marion on April 28, 1781, Greene (Greene in Bass 1959: 182) 
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 American General Daniel Morgan defeated the British Colonel Tarleton (Smith et al. 2007:18). 
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ordered them to “take all the posts upon the Congaree, and those that lie between 
Camden and the River.” They were to start with Fort Watson. 
                                
 Figure 4.4 Francis Marion (Lossing [1860]           Figure 4.5 Henry Lee (Lossing  
 2004: 150)                    [1860]2004: 63) 
 
The attack on Fort Watson began what has come to be known as the ‘war of 
posts’ (Smith et al. 2007: 19). This was a major American offensive against the British 
posts and fortifications and supply routes in the South Carolina backcountry. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, Fort Watson was constructed on the summit of Santee Indian 
Mound, a 23 foot tall mound overlooking Scott’s Lake. On April 15, 1781 Marion and Lee 
began an eight day siege of the fort. The capture of Fort Watson gave Marion and Lee 
the supplies, ammunition, and morale necessary to attack the nearby Fort Motte (Smith 
et al. 2007). 
The Siege of Fort Motte 
The siege of Fort Motte took place between May 6 and 12, 1781. British forces 
totaled 184 men, including 80 Regulars (84th Regiment), 59 Hessian troops, and 45 
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Provincials (Smith et al. 2007: 22). Lieutenant Donald McPherson held command. While 
the British were equipped with one artillery piece, it was not in place and remained 
unused during the siege. On May 6, Marion and Lee encamped near the fort. Marion 
and Lee’s joint force totaled 398 American militiamen and Continentals; Lee 
commanded approximately 248 men while Marion commanded 150 (Marion in Conrad 
et al. 1995). “Colonel Lee had posted his Continentals to the north of Mount Joseph and 
around an old log cabin in which Mrs. Motte was then living” (Bass 1959: 189; Smith et 
al. 2007: 24). Lee (1869: 345) also asserted that his camp was located around the Motte 
farmhouse on the hill to the northwest of Fort Motte. Marion utilized the nearby 
Belleville Plantation for himself and his militia (Smith et al. 2007: 23).  
Beginning their attack, the Americans surrounded the Fort and set up several 
firing stations. One American asset was a six-pounder artillery piece under the 
command of Captain Ebenezer Finley, a Continental artillery officer (Smith et al. 2007: 
21). An artillery mound was constructed to the east of the fort. The six-pounder was 
positioned to rake the north side of the fort. 
It would have been a costly endeavor to cross the open field and the row of 
abatis before traversing the earthen fortifications and wooden palisade of Fort Motte. 
Therefore, Marion and Lee decided against a direct assault and opted instead for 
“digging a sap, or siege approach” (Smith et al. 2007: 23). Slaves from Belleville, Mount 
Joseph, and perhaps other neighboring plantations set to work digging a sap towards 
the fort (Smith et al. 2007). The sap started within “400 yards of the fort” (Lee 1869: 
345). As will be discussed further in Chapter 7, the sap was dug in a zig-zagging pattern 
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towards the fort. This was the norm of eighteenth century siegecraft (Jorgensen 2005; 
Vauban 1740) (Figure 4.6).  
  
 Figure 4.6 Vauban’s sap diagram (Vauban 1740: 45) 
 
As Lee oversaw the digging of the sap, Marion deployed sharpshooters against 
Fort Motte. Bass (1959: 189) makes mention of “sniping” during the siege and Smith et 
al. (2007: 23) state that Marion set “riflemen firing at the fort to keep the British heads 
down and off the fort wall.” Smith et al. (2007: 55) also state that “only with rifles could 
the Americans hope to inflict casualties on the defenders, or at least pin them down 
well enough to suppress defensive fire directed at the siege approaches.” The use of a 
musket under these circumstances would have been ineffective. A rifle could accurately 
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fire at those in the fort while keeping the shooter of such a weapon out of the British 
range of fire.  
Lieutenant MacDonald (mentioned in Chapter 3) may have been one of the 
rifleman sharpshooters active during the siege of Fort Motte. He had been previously 
noted for brave action at Spring Hill and Georgetown and was known to have been an 
excellent shot (Bass 1959). As discussed below, he was also one of the American 
casualties sustained at Fort Motte.  
Lee and Marion planned to dig the sap as close as possible and have Lee’s 
Continentals rush the fort (Lee 1869; Smith et al. 2007). By May 10, the sap had nearly 
reached the row of abatis. The Americans sent a message to offer McPherson the 
chance to surrender; he rejected their demand. However, it was soon learned that 
Rawdon had abandoned Camden (Smith et al. 2007). On the night of May 11, Rawdon’s 
campfires could be seen in the distance and both British and American forces involved 
at Fort Motte believed that Rawdon was coming to the aid of the British defenders (Lee 
1869: 346). Lee and Marion decided they needed to act immediately to capture the fort 
before reinforcements could arrive. Their solution was to set fire to the Motte house 
and force a surrender.  
The Americans set fire to the roof of the house (Lee 1869; Rawdon in Gibbes 
1855: 79), likely using fire arrows (Smith et al. 2007). When British defenders climbed 
onto the roof in an attempt to extinguish the flames, the American six-pounder was 
utilized to drive them back inside. McPherson quickly understood his situation and 
surrendered the fort. The fire was put out after the Americans accepted McPherson’s 
59 
 
surrender. Two American casualties were sustained including Lieutenant Allen 
MacDonald and Lieutenant Cruger (Smith et al. 2007: 26-27). However, these fatalities 
were understood as “considerable losses” for Marion (Bass 1959: 194). No British 
casualties were sustained during the siege. However, at least three British Provincials 
were hung after their capture (Smith 1782; Smith et al. 2007). A fourth was being strung 
up when Marion put an end to the unauthorized executions. Levi Smith, the commander 
of the Loyalist troops at Fort Motte, as well as a local informer and spy, narrowly 
escaped with his life (Smith 1782). 
After McPherson surrendered, the palisade was torn down and the moat 
backfilled (Conrad et al. 1995: 293; Smith et al. 2007). All of the British officers captured 
at Fort Motte were paroled. Rawdon had abandoned Camden and, instead of making for 
Fort Motte, as both parties involved in the siege had assumed he would, he instead 
made for the British post at Nelson’s Ferry (Smith et al. 2007). 
The War of Posts continued. American Colonel Thomas Sumter took the British 
post at Orangeburg on May 11 and when Greene arrived at Fort Motte on the evening 
of May 12 he sent Lee north to capture Fort Granby, and Marion east to take 
Georgetown (Smith et al. 2007). Fort Granby fell to Lee on May 15 and Georgetown was 
taken May 28. 
Compared to other Revolutionary battles, Fort Motte was a small-scale victory. 
However, it was “significant as part of the ‘War of Posts’ that broke the British hold on 
the South Carolina backcountry” (Smith et al. 2007: 1). Ultimately, the American capture 
of Fort Motte “signaled the imminent collapse of British control” (Smith et al. 2007: 34). 
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4.3 POST-SIEGE HISTORY OF SITE AND LAND USAGE  
After the war ended, Rebecca Motte sold the property and moved to a 
plantation on the Santee River (Smith et al. 2007: 34). A historian named Benjamin 
Lossing visited the Fort Motte area in 1849 (Lossing [1860]2004: 148) and wrote that the 
original Motte home had been destroyed by the fire set during the siege and had to be 
rebuilt. At the time of Lossing’s visit, the site was owned by Mr. William Love who had 
built another house over the site of the original Motte house. However, an account by 
Major James ([1821]1948: 121) tells a different story and indicates that the Motte home 
was habitable in November 1781. James’ account suggests that the fire did not 
completely destroy the Motte mansion.  
Also, several mid to late nineteenth century artifacts have been recovered at the 
site and are especially prevalent along the ridge to the west of Fort Motte. These items 
include several Civil War military artifacts and may indicate a Civil War encampment at 
the site during the mid-nineteenth century.  
More recently, the area was used during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century as a dairy farm called the Moye Plantation (Smith et al. 2007: 9). The site is 
currently located on two hills along the Congaree River in Calhoun County, South 
Carolina. Both hills are bounded on the north and west sides by the Congaree River and 
on the east by Buckhead Creek. The property is owned by Mr. Luther Wannamaker and 




Figure 4.7 DAR monument 
 
Terracing in the latter half of the twentieth century has altered the slope to the 
north of the fort. Bulldozing removed the artillery mound to the east of the fort. 
Additionally, ongoing agricultural and timbering activities have had an effect on the site. 
The property is gated to restrict unauthorized access. However, relic collectors 
have been active at the site since the late eighteenth century. More recently, relic 
collectors have made use of metal detectors on the property. This activity has affected 
the quantity of artifacts remaining at the site and must be taken into consideration in 
















PREVIOUS ARCHAEOLOGICAL WORK 
Data for this thesis came from several archaeological field seasons between 2004 
(Smith et al. 2007) and 2013. In this chapter I will summarize the archaeological work at 
the Fort Motte site (38CL1) prior to 2012. On August 15, 2004 the National Park Service, 
American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP) awarded SCIAA with grant No.GA-2255-
04-011 to conduct an archaeological survey of Fort Motte (Smith et al. 2007: 1-2). This 
survey was intended to provide additional data in order to revise the 1972 NRHP 
assessment and expand the site boundary to include the entire battlefield. 
Dr. Steven D. Smith and other archaeologists from SCIAA worked at the Fort 
Motte site as they were able between 2004 and 2006 (Smith et al. 2007: 10). During this 
time both metal detection surveys and controlled trench excavations were conducted. 
Specifically of interest to this thesis, a total of 108 lead shot were recovered from all 
archaeological work conducted at Fort Motte prior to 2012.  
Various methods were used to locate these artifacts. The primary objective of all 
archaeological work conducted prior to 2012 was to locate the battlefield’s defining 
features; these included Mrs. Motte’s house, the farmhouse, the American sap, the 
artillery mound, and camp locations for both sides. Archaeologists attempted to locate 
other outbuildings and features as well; however their location was a secondary goal. 
Methods included metal detecting, excavation, and GPR survey, in addition to minimal
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surface collecting around the Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR) monument. 
Archaeologists from SCIAA also used KOCOA analysis (Key terrain, Obstacles, Cover and 
concealment, Observation and fields of fire, and Avenues of approach and retreat) to 
assist in the location of defining battlefield features.  
Metal detection was the primary means of finding battle-related artifacts 
surrounding the fort. In total, the metal detection survey between 2004 and 2006 
covered approximately four acres (Smith et al. 2007: 4). This acreage includes the area 
immediately surrounding the fort as well as other areas related to the battle (Figure 
5.1). The metal detection survey carried out around the fort was conducted in a 
systematic manner. Metal detection areas were blocked off and flagged. Two or more 
metal detector operators walked in overlapping transects within the designated blocks. 
Transects were approximately 1.5 meters wide; operators used the plow rows as guide 
lines. Operators worked with excellent surface visibility around the DAR monument as 
the field had been recently cultivated with oats. 
Metal detectors used included a Fisher 1270® with a 9” coil, a “Double Eagle” 
with a 15” coil, a Whites Sierra Madre® “Blue Max Deep Scan 950” with a 9” coil, and a 
Tesoro® Cibola with a 9” coil (Smith et al. 2007: 4-5). All metal detector readings were 
immediately excavated by the detector operator. Each artifact was put into a plastic bag 
and given a unique provenience number. The find location was then marked with a pin 
flag which was marked with the same number as the artifact. The pin flags were then 
mapped using a Sokkia® total station transit (Smith et al. 2007: 4). For the most part, 




        Figure 5.1 Map of metal detecting areas (Smith et al. 2007: 46) 
 
 
Metal detection in areas other than the main fort position included an attempt 
to locate the American artillery position which was historically positioned to sweep the 
north wall of the fort (Smith et al. 2007: 7). However, the artillery mound was leveled 
due to logging activity in the 1980s. Aerial photographs from 1937 and 1948 show its 
position to the east of the fort moat. Using these photographs and modern maps of the 
area, archaeologists attempted to locate the exact position by systematically metal 
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detecting the area. The positions of American and British camp positions were also 
sought. Lee’s men are recorded as camping at the overseer’s house (Lee 1869: 345) 
while Marion’s men supposedly camped closer to the fort (Smith et al. 2007: 7). Both 
areas were systematically detected. 
A ‘search to find’ method was used to search the rest of the property, specifically 
focusing on ‘likely’ locations (Smith et al. 2007: 7). When an eighteenth century artifact 
was located, a ½ acre area was blocked off and covered more intensely in a systematic 
manner. Artifacts were excavated, bagged, and given provenience numbers. Artifact 
locations were recorded using a GPS. GPS instruments used included Trimble, Inc 
models Geoexplorer and Geoexplorer3®. At least 120 readings were taken for each find, 
in order to provide “sub-meter accuracy after data processing” (Smith et al. 2007: 7). 
The GIS software used in data processing was ArcGIS® version 9. 
A Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) survey of the fort area was also conducted in 
order to help locate fort features such as the moat, palisade, house foundation, and 
chimney. The GPR survey was carried out in the area near the DAR monument as well as 
along site grid lines. More information on this GPR survey can be found in Smith et al. 
(2007: 6-7). 
Additionally, a limited trench excavation was conducted across the fort area 
(Smith et al. 2007: 4). The primary objective of the trench excavation was to locate and 
assess the fort. One meter and ½ meter wide trenches were excavated across the site 
near the DAR monument and near the highest concentration of eighteenth and 
nineteenth century surface artifacts. Additional trenches were placed to the north of the 
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fort in an attempt to intercept the American sap (Smith et al. 2007: 6). Trenches were 
dug along north/south and east/west gridlines and were excavated with shovels. Plow 
zone soils were not screened (Smith et al. 2007: 5). 
A segment of the moat surrounding the fort was also excavated. All feature fill 
was screened through ¼” wire mesh screen. All artifacts were collected, bagged, and 
given unique provenience numbers. Archaeologists maintained feature and level forms 
and stratigraphic profiles were drawn and photographed for all excavations.  
All artifacts recovered were taken to SCIAA where they were cleaned and 
stabilized. Analysis was conducted based on material type, function, and description 
(Smith et al. 2007: 8). All artifacts were cataloged and given permanent provenience 
numbers.  National Park Service Standards and SCIAA curation standards were followed 
for curation of all of the artifacts recovered from Fort Motte. Artifacts were placed into 
acid-free bags which were labeled with permanent ink. Artifact bags were then 
organized in acid-free medium sized boxes. All record data was also included in these 
boxes (see Smith et al. 2007: 8 for further details). 
After the 2005 excavation, the ammunition from Fort Motte was analyzed by Jim 
Legg (Legg in Smith et al. 2007). He individually examined lead shot for weight, 
diameter, type, condition, composition, and noted any other distinctive marks or 
features. Weight was measured to the nearest tenth of a gram. Diameter was measured 
to the nearest thousandth of an inch. Unfired balls were measured with calipers and 
fired balls were given projected measurements using the Sivilich formula (Sivilich 1996). 
Surface characteristics were observed with a handheld loupe with a power of 20X. Other 
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characteristics of lead shot were also documented; for example, whether the balls had 
been fired or dropped, as well as the material into which the shot impacted (wood, 
sand, bone, etc).  
Data gathered from the 2004-2006 archaeological survey and excavation at the 
Fort Motte battlefield site allowed researchers at SCIAA to revise the site’s nomination 
to the National Register. This revised nomination was accepted by SCSHPO on 
November 17, 2006 (Smith et al. 2007: 8). Currently the Fort Motte Battlefield is listed 
on the NRHP and is recognized as having national significance (Smith et al. 2007: 2). A 
full description of the methods used and artifacts recovered between 2004 and 2006 
















6.1 RESEARCH METHODS 
I focused my research for this thesis on primary historical documents such as 
reports from military personnel, military maps, manuals, and narrative accounts. These 
types of documents are especially useful in the analysis of conflict sites. Military 
manuals were written to prepare for likely scenarios and represent the ideal action in a 
given situation for both individuals and groups of soldiers. These documents can also 
help to “address observable features and support inferential interpretations of 
archaeological materials” (Bleed and Scott 2011: 48). I also examined secondary sources 
that discussed eighteenth century firearms, tactics, and the history of the Revolutionary 
War.  
Much research about Fort Motte and the Siege in 1781 had already been 
conducted by Dr. Steven D. Smith. The original Fort Motte archaeological report (Smith 
et al. 2007) gives a thorough general history of the battlefield. My research in 2011-
2013 focused more specifically on the involvement of riflemen in the American 
Revolution and a more detailed tactical analysis and firearms study of the mid-
eighteenth century (Chapter 3). Libraries utilized for this research include:  
 Thomas Cooper Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia 
 Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia
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 South Carolina State Library, Columbia 
 Department of Archives and History, Columbia, South Carolina 
6.2 ANALYTICAL METHODS 
In my analysis of the Fort Motte site, I focus on the cultural variability and 
individual agency of military behavior evident at the tactical level. The majority of this 
evidence is seen in the close analysis of lead shot. My analysis of the lead shot 
recovered from Fort Motte looks at both material and spatial attributes. Therefore, this 
thesis utilized a weight-diameter analysis, a general surface analysis, and a spatial 
analysis of the lead shot recovered from Fort Motte. 
It is asserted here that eighteenth century lead shot inherits surface and shape 
modifications that are the result of human behavior and reflect cultural variability. 
While all eighteenth century firearms utilized lead (or lead alloy) spherical shot, the size 
of lead shot used with different firearms shows remarkable distinction. Thus, I 
conducted a detailed weight/diameter analysis of the total lead shot recovered from 
Fort Motte as well as a weight/diameter analysis of the two major data sets indicating 
individual sharpshooting activity.  
In addition to size, other surface characteristics of lead shot can be also used to 
determine the type of firearm that fired each ball. These include evidence of patching, 
rolling, rifling, windage, and impact. I have closely analyzed all of the lead shot included 
in the Fort Motte assemblage for surface characteristics as a part of the general 
assessment and lead shot analysis. The general surface examination of lead shot 
71 
 
recovered during 2012 was conducted in an identical manner by Legg and myself to 
maintain cohesion with the previous analysis (Legg in Smith et al. 2007). 
The context in which lead shot is found is also important in determining cultural 
affiliation because it is through context that one can analyze behavior. Therefore, a 
close and detailed analysis of the spatial distribution of lead shot recovered from Fort 
Motte was also conducted. The methods used in all of these analyses (weight/diameter, 
general surface, and spatial distribution) will be discussed below. 
Weight/Diameter Analysis 
The diameter of a lead ball is an especially valuable measurement for 
determining the type of firearm that was designed to fire it. Unfired lead shot was 
measured directly with calipers. This provided a very accurate diameter measurement. 
However, once a ball has been fired it loses its original spherical shape. Therefore, fired 
balls were not measured with calipers. Sivilich (1996) demonstrated that it is possible to 
determine a projected diameter of a lead ball based on its weight in grams. Sivilich’s 
(1996) formula is based on the fact that the weight and diameter of lead shot are 
interrelated.10  
Diameter in inches = 0.223204 x (Weight in grams)1/3   (Sivilich 1996: 104) 
Only lead shot can be measured in this way; pewter or lead alloy balls cannot be 
projected using this formula.  Utilizing Sivilich’s formula, Jim Legg has compiled a 
database of weights and projected diameters for lead shot between 1.0g and 34.4g 
                                                          
10
 To test this formula, archaeologists at the South Carolina Institute of Archaeology and Anthropology 
(SCIAA) measured unfired lead shot using calipers. The archaeologists then weighed the lead shot and 
used Sivilich’s formula to determine a projected diameter for each ball. The caliper diameter was then 
compared to the projected diameter. The formula was found to be reliable within .001 inches. This 
method is very useful for determining the original diameter of lead shot.  
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(Legg, personal database). I calculated the weights of the Fort Motte lead shot and then 
used Legg’s database of pre-calculated diameters to determine the projected diameter 
of all fired balls.  
Sivilich’s (1996; 2007) analysis of lead shot used diameter or projected diameter 
to identify the firearm that fired or would have been used to fire each ball. He was able 
to identify these firearms due to musket ball variation. I will expand this methodology to 
include all lead shot recovered from Fort Motte.  
At the time of the American Revolution, two caliber sizes were used for 
smoothbore muskets: .69 caliber and .75 caliber. The French Charleville was a .69 caliber 
musket. It fired a ball that was about 0.63” in diameter. The British Land Pattern was a 
.75 caliber musket and fired a ball that was approximately 0.69” in diameter. Therefore, 
if one knows a “musket ball’s diameter, one can estimate the bore of the gun it came 
from” (Sivilich 2007: 86). 
Unlike musket balls, there was significant variation in the size of rifle balls 
(Peterson 2000; Sivilich 2007). Rifles were crafted alongside a unique “iron mold sized to 
his rifle bore by the gunsmith” (Lagemann and Manucy 1993: 17). All rifle balls were 
consistently much smaller in diameter than either of the musket balls of the time but 
otherwise differed from one another quite a bit. Eighteenth century rifle balls ranged 
from .30 caliber to .60 caliber. However, the most common range during the time of the 
Revolution was between .50 and .55 caliber (Legg in Smith et al. 2007: 55). As a result of 
the necessity to only use lead shot cast from the specific mold for each rifle, it is 
possible to look at the individual action of riflemen within the context of a small scale 
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siege battle like Fort Motte. Individual action is evidenced by certain clusters of similar-
sized rifle balls. In order to identify these clusters, I conducted a weight/diameter 
analysis with the Fort Motte rifle ball data.  
According to Legg’s (Legg in Smith et al. 2007) description of the 2004-2006 Fort 
Motte ammunition, I included both ‘rifle balls’ and ‘probable rifle balls’ in the 
weight/diameter analysis. ‘Probable rifle balls’ are defined as lead shot of rifle size 
and/or weight that do not have obvious evidence of patch marks or rifling. There is a 
chance that some of the ‘probable rifle balls’ may be large buckshot or small British 
carbine or trade gun balls. However, because buckshot weighs less (average between 2 
and 4g) and carbine and trade gun balls weigh more (average between 18 and 21g) than 
the majority of rifle balls, I am confident that any overlap of ammunition type will not 
detract from the overall study, nor should it interfere with my analysis of distinct rifle 
ball clusters. 
To ensure the integrity of the data presented, I have removed lead shot that 
have been cut. This is to maintain an accurate measurement of exact weight and 
projected diameter at the time of use directly before deposition. Nor will I include lead 
alloy rifle balls in my weight/diameter analysis. If I included such altered shot in my 
analysis, the distribution of lead shot would be skewed. Legg (in Smith et al. 2007) made 
some estimations of original weight in his analysis of the 2004-2006 data; however, I felt 
that for this study, it would be best to simply remove cut lead shot from consideration. 
Similarly, I will not include melted lead, as it is not possible to determine if the melted 
lead object was indeed lead shot or some other object.  
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Some of the lead shot in the assemblage were determined to have been 
‘chewed,’ most likely by hogs (Figure 6.1). Chewing does not necessarily indicate a loss 
of mass as does cutting. Therefore, the chewed balls were entered into my database 
and were analyzed based on weight and projected diameter. However, the act of 
chewing inherently removes any surface characteristics such as rifling or patch marks on 
a ball. Therefore, chewed shot will be referred to as ‘probable rifle balls’ or ‘probable 
.69 caliber musket ball’, etc. based on size.  
 
      Figure 6.1 Photograph of hog chewed ball 
 
Some of the lead shot also exhibited signs of rodent gnawing. Such gnawing may 
slowly diminish the mass of the ball, since the rodents actually ingest the lead. Slight 
rodent gnawing will not detract from the weight of a ball. However, considerable 
gnawing can affect the projected diameter. Thus, significantly gnawed lead shot was not 
included in my weight/diameter analysis of the ammunition recovered from Fort Motte.  
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Data from all lead shot (excluding the exceptions listed above) (n=134) recovered 
from Fort Motte between 2004 and 2012 was compiled into a single database, the 
analysis of which will be discussed in Chapter 7. To conduct the weight/diameter 
analysis, I organized data from recovered lead shot to create charts using Microsoft 
Excel to depict the weight/diameter distribution of lead shot. I made charts specifically 
for the Fort Motte assemblage as well as other Revolutionary War sites in South 
Carolina, including Fort Watson, Wadboo Plantation, Williamson’s Plantation, Dunham’s 
Bluff, Hickory Hill, Black Mingo, and Black Mingo North in order to compare these 
weight/diameter patterns. 
Two types of charts were created to best demonstrate the lead shot data: 1) a 
scatterplot chart that shows the exact relationship between the weight and diameter of 
lead shot, and 2) a weight distribution chart that shows the quantity of lead shot 
recovered at each weight category (divided by the span of 1 gram). The weight 
distribution charts in this chapter use arbitrary 1g weight range divisions. These charts 
were then analyzed in terms of individual agency by looking for clusters of similar 
weight/diameter shot (specifically rifle balls). Therefore, it was necessary to compare 
the weight distribution charts to the scatterplot charts in order to avoid missing any 
clusters that were divided by these arbitrary weight categories.  
Examples of the total lead shot distribution scatterplot chart based on 
weight/diameter and the weight distribution chart can be seen in Figure 6.2 and Figure 
6.3, respectively. To illustrate this type of analysis, I have used ammunition data from 
the Revolutionary War site of Fort Watson. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, the Fort 
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Motte data represents an anomaly for Revolutionary War data and would therefore not 
be a good initial representation of a distribution of lead shot based on weight and 
diameter.  
 



















































Fort Watson Total Lead Shot 
Distribution by Weight 
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As Figure 6.2 shows, eighteenth century lead shot recovered from Fort Watson 
ranges in size from buckshot at the left to .75 caliber musket balls on the right. Certain 
groupings can be seen. These have been circled in Figure 6.2 and show, from left to 
right: buckshot circled in yellow, rifle balls circled in blue, .69 caliber balls circled in 
green, and .75 caliber balls circled in red. The standardization of both .69 and .75 caliber 
musket balls is clearly visible. Similarly, the wide range of rifle calibers is also evident.  
The present investigation is innovative because it uses the data from a 
weight/diameter analysis to trace individual action. Within the rifle ball distribution 
depicted in Figure 6.2, certain clusters are visible. These can be identified as lead shot 
possibly fired from an individual firearm. The range of variability for lead shot fired from 
an individual rifle has been determined to be within a hundredth of an inch in diameter 
and a tenth of a gram in weight (Smith et al. 2007). Such clusters in the Fort Motte lead 
shot assemblage will be analyzed further in Chapter 7. The ranges of musket ball 
sizes/weights are not significant in this regard, since windage was needed for rapid 
musket fire. The range of rifle shot is much more meaningful to the study of individual 
rifles because of the need for a tight fit. 
General surface analysis  
Smith et al. (2007: 1-3) assert that the size is most important for an analysis of 
firearm typology based on lead shot. However, certain surface characteristics on lead 
shot, such as rifling or patching, can also be helpful for determining the type of firearm 
used. Surface characteristics were observed with a handheld loupe with a power of 20X. 
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Patching is indicative of a rifle ball. However, at times, rifle balls were not 
patched. Rifle balls can also be identified by direct evidence of rifling on the surface of 
the lead. Rifling can be seen as evenly spaced patch marks (for a patched ball) or scrapes 
(as is the case with an unpatched ball) (Legg in Smith et al. 2007). Rifling marks 
correspond to the lands inside the bore of a rifle (Figure 6.4). 
 
         Figure 6.4 Three distinct patched rifling marks 
 
Additionally, some firearms were not actually rifled, but were used in the same 
manner as a rifle. Like rifled rifles, these “unrifled ‘rifles’” (Legg in Smith et al. 2007: I-5), 
or smoothbore rifles, would have had minimal windage; the ball would have fit very 
tightly in the bore. Smoothbore rifles would have been a less expensive and less 
accurate alternative to a rifled rifle. But, these firearms would have been much more 
accurate than any smoothbore musket with a loose fitting ball (Moller 1993: 180). 
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Evidence of smoothbore rifle fire can be seen on the surface of lead shot as a patched 
full barrel mark (Figure 6.5). Additionally, evidence of minimal windage can be seen as a 
full heavy barrel mark (See Figure 6.5). Such a mark indicates that a ball was fired from a 
firearm in which the bore diameter, or caliber, is equal or lesser than the diameter of 
the shot.  
Evidence of the British production process can be seen in surface dimples on 
some unfired .75 caliber British musket balls (Figure 6.6). These dimples were created by 
large numbers of musket balls being rolled in a barrel to remove any inconsistencies, 
such as the mold seam and sprue, prior to distribution (Legg in Smith et al. 2007).  
          
Figure 6.5 Full barrel patch mark as                    Figure 6.6 Surface dimples caused by    
evidence of minimal windage in a                        the rolling process seen on an unfired .75                   
‘smoothbore rifle’        caliber musket ball 
 
Spatial distribution analysis 
The Fort Motte lead shot data was organized by type according to the 
weight/diameter analysis and general surface analysis. The recovery location for each 
ball was then assessed. GPS location data was downloaded using GPS Pathfinder Office 
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software. Using ESRI’s ArcGIS Suite 10 software, Tamara Wilson created several spatial 
distributions maps (for example, maps of fired and unfired lead shot categorized by 
type). These maps were then analyzed, specifically in the context of identifying and 
discussing collective and individual behavior at Fort Motte. These maps will be discussed 
further in Chapter 7. 
6.3 FIELD METHODS 
Battlefields are generally comprised of relatively few artifacts in a widely 
dispersed area (Espenshade et al. 2002). Therefore, in order to adequately explore such 
a site archaeologically it is necessary to use methods of systematic metal detection in 
addition to more conventional unit excavation. 
In May 2012, a team of archaeologists from SCIAA and a group of students from 
USC returned to Fort Motte and conducted another round of systematic metal 
detection.  This field effort was conducted as a joint archaeological project with myself 
and Dr. Steven D. Smith. Our primary objectives were to recover additional lead shot for 
this thesis and to gather more data in order to plan future full-scale excavations at the 
site. Field work consisted primarily of systematic metal detection to recover lead shot. 
Unit excavation was conducted as a secondary means of collecting lead shot as well as a 
way to gather information about the fort, especially the moat and palisade surrounding 
the Motte house.  
Metal Detection Survey 
Systematic metal detection was conducted in two areas during the May 2012 
field season: directly around Fort Motte (Metal Detection Areas 3, 5, and 6) and the site 
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of the overseer’s house (Metal Detection Area 12). Both of these areas had been 
previously detected in 2004-2006. The overseer’s house site was covered in thick 
vegetation which inhibited metal detection previously. However, in May of 2012, the 
area had been recently plowed and planted with clover. This made metal detection of 
the area much more productive.  
Balicki (2011) asserts that several different types of metal detectors should be 
employed at military sites and that several individuals should sweep the same area to 
increase the coverage of the site. Additionally, Babits (2001) suggests that detectorists 
should walk transects in one direction and then switch to walk perpendicular to the 
original transects. All of these suggestions were employed in the 2012 metal detection 
at Fort Motte. A variety of metal detectors were used. The primary detector used was a 
Tesoro, Inc. ® Cibola with a 9” coil. This detector offers good discrimination. The other 
detector used was the Garrett AT PRO.  
Metal detection was conducted within designated block areas. These areas were 
marked with pin flags and the corners of these blocks were recorded with a total station 
electronic transit. Detectorists walked within each block along loose transects, sweeping 
the ground.11 Transects were approximately 1.5 meters wide, which is the width of a 
single sweep of a metal detector (Smith et al. 2007). Detectorists followed plow rows to 
                                                          
11
 The initial use of this specific methodology of the block technique was utilized by Legg and Smith at the 
Camden Battlefield (Legg et al. 2005). The block technique, in turn, was a modification of metal detecting 
methodology utilized at the Little Bighorn Battlefield. Archaeological investigations of the Battle of Little 
Bighorn (Fox 1993; Scott and Fox 1987; Scott and McFeaters 2011) led to important advances in the field 
of conflict archaeology, specifically the creation of a highly organized and systematic methodology for the 
use of metal detector surveys. Several detectorists walked these areas in transects, sweeping the ground. 
The location of each find or ‘hit’ was recorded with a GPS. Archaeologists then recorded the exact location 
of individual artifacts and applied “modern firearms identification techniques” for their ammunition 
analysis (Scott and McFeaters 2011: 109). 
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maintain straight transects. Each designated detection area was separately covered by 
at least two trained detectorists.  
 





Table 6.1 List of Fort Motte archaeological proveniences: 2005-2012 (modified from Smith et al. 
2007: 38-9) 
01 General surface collection artifacts in the immediate vicinity of Fort Motte 
02 Mapped surface artifacts in the immediate vicinity of Fort Motte 
03 Mapped metal detection artifacts from Collection Area 3 (including Fort Motte) 
04 Mapped metal detection artifacts from Collection Area 4 (in the woods northeast of Fort  
               Motte) 
05 Mapped metal detection artifacts from Collection Area 5 (in the lower field west of 
Collection Area 6) 
06 Mapped metal detection artifacts from Collection Area 6 (west of Collection Area 3) 
07 Excavated artifacts from the 1m section of the southern ditch of Fort Motte 
08 Excavated plow zone artifacts from the 2x2m unit overlying the brick chimney base just 
north of the DAR monument 
09 Artifacts from the surface of the northern ditch of Fort Motte, exposed in the northern 
test trench 
10 Mapped metal detection artifacts from Collection Area 10 (18th/early 19th century 
domestic site in the woods south of Fort Motte) 
11 Mapped metal detection artifacts from Collection Area 11 (in the woods southeast of 
Fort Motte) 
12 Mapped metal detection and surface artifacts from Collection Area 12 (18th century 
domestic site on the east end of the hill north-northeast of Fort Motte) 
13 Artifacts collected from test trenches in the southern Fort Motte ditch  
14 Surface collection artifacts collected by Landowner family in the immediate vicinity of 
Fort Motte 
15 Mapped metal detection artifacts from Collection Area 15 
16 Reserved for artifacts from Collection Area 16 (the site of the American battery) – No 
artifacts recovered to date 
17 Excavated artifacts from 2012 unit excavation in the immediate vicinity of Fort Motte  
18 Metal detection artifacts from Collection Area 18 (the possible American camp site west 
of Fort Motte) 
 
When a metal object was detected, the detectorist immediately excavated the 
location with a shovel. Each find was dug to locate and retrieve the metal object. If 
other artifacts were discovered during this retrieval, they were also recovered. This soil 
was not screened due to the delicate nature of lead shot and other metal artifacts; 
however, the soil was hand sifted. After retrieving the metal object, the detectorist 
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swept the location again. If another hit was detected, the process was repeated. If no hit 
was detected, the hole was backfilled and the detectorist moved on.  
Collected artifacts were placed in a plastic bag. Each find was marked with a pin 
flag next to which bagged artifacts were left to await documentation. Another team 
member came behind the detectorists and recorded the location with either a total 
station electronic transit or a GPS unit, as is discussed below. The artifact was then given 
a unique bag number for field identification and recorded in the official bag list. As a 
general rule, metal artifacts dating later than the eighteenth century were not collected. 
The majority of such artifacts were late nineteenth century nails and railroad spikes 
(Smith et al. 2007: 9). 
 
Figure 6.8 The author metal detecting in the expanded  
Area 3 
 
A Sokkia® SCT6 Construction Total Station was used to map the exact location of 
metal detector finds in Metal Detection Areas 3, 5, and 6 directly around the fort. A 
Trimble GeoXH GeoExplorer 2008 Series GPS unit was used to record the location of 
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each find in all other areas. A minimum of 120 positions were taken at each point. The 
accuracy of these recorded points is determined to be less than one meter. 
 
                        Figure 6.9 Detectorist Spencer Barker marking a find in Area 3 
 
This methodology allows for a clear understanding of the spatial distribution of 
the metal eighteenth century artifacts at Fort Motte. Such precise location data also 
provides the opportunity to discuss individual and group behavior of both American and 
British combatants in the context of the battle event. Several spatial distribution maps 
were created based on this data and will be discussed further in Chapter 7. 
During our metal detection of the site, we experienced some issues and 
limitations. One of these was the prevalence of late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century railroad spikes in the open field surrounding the DAR monument. According to 
local land managers, railroad ties were used for fencing on the property when it was 
part of the Moye Plantation dairy farm (Smith et al. 2007). The railroad spikes caused 
much frustration among the detectorists. As discussed in Chapter 4, the site has been 
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previously relic collected and looted. These spikes likely equally frustrated relic 
collectors in the past. This may be one reason why there is still a significant amount of 
lead shot and other battle related artifacts present at the site today. We did not collect 
railroad spikes. However, to keep from digging the same spikes, we temporarily 
gathered them in one location. After we finished metal detecting around the fort, we 
scattered the spikes across the field, hoping to deter future relic collectors. 
Another limitation was the actual depth of soil penetration of the metal 
detectors at the site. Our team conducted systematic metal detection of the area laid 
out for unit excavation prior to any groundbreaking. However, metal objects and lead 
shot (n=6) were still recovered in our unit excavations. Thus, it was determined that, in 
practice at Fort Motte, the depth range of the metal detectors used was limited to 15-
20cmbs. 
Three detectorists, including the author, from SCIAA returned to the site for two 
days in November 2012. At this time, systematic metal detection was conducted in the 
area directly to the northeast of the Fort (part of Metal Detection Area 3). This area had 
been quite productive in past field seasons. Significantly, several .75 caliber musket balls 
were recovered here, leading to the hypothesis that this area may have been the 
location of the American sap (Smith et al. 2007: 57). The trained detectorists 
systematically walked this area in an overlapping and staggering fashion in order to 
recover the maximum amount of lead shot. The site around the Fort had recently been 
very finely plowed, with furrows less than two inches apart and approximately two 
inches deep. Previous metal detection in the area was conducted after the field had 
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been plowed as well. However, previous plow furrows were closer to twelve inches 
apart and five to six inches deep. The finely plowed field encountered in November 
allowed for much more productive metal detection in the area. 
Additionally, an area to the west of the Fort (Metal Detection Area 18) was 
systematically detected by two trained detectorists. This area was previously 
undetected by the SCIAA. Finds from both of these areas will be discussed in Chapter 7.  
Unit excavation 
Five 1 x 1 meter and twenty-four 1 x 2 meter units were laid out across the fort 
area. The units were mapped with a total station electronic transit to document their 
precise location. Units were laid out and excavated from east to west in order to 
encounter the moat and palisade, as well as any other fort related features (Figure 
6.10). 
Units were excavated down to feature level in order to photograph and record 
both domestic and battle-related aspects of the site. Archaeologists worked in teams of 
two: one digging and one screening. Plow zone soils were screened through ¼” wire 
mesh screen. Ten centimeters of feature level was also excavated. This soil was 
screened through ¼” wire mesh screen. Features located during excavation were 
carefully documented. Team archaeologists sketched scale drawings and photographed 
all features as well as the feature level of all units. Soil texture and Munsell soil color 
was assessed for feature level soils.  
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Recovered artifacts were organized separately by unit and placed in paper bags. 
All artifact bags were labeled with unit and level provenience information. A bag list as 
well as unit, level, and feature excavation forms were carefully maintained. 
 
 Figure 6.10 Layout of 2012 excavation units 
 
Thousands of artifacts (n=4036) were recovered including lead shot, iron 
canister, historic glass and ceramics, nails, as well as a limited amount of prehistoric 
ceramics and lithic material. It is not the purpose of this thesis to detail all of the finds 
for the 2012 field season. A full site report for May and November 2012 work is 
currently being written by the SCIAA. This thesis focuses solely on ammunition collected 






 Figure 6.11 Alison Baker and Jonathan Whitlatch excavating units 
 
6.4 LABORATORY METHODS 
All cultural material recovered was cleaned and stabilized or treated (when 
appropriate) according to material type. An artifact catalog was created to document 
material type, dimensions, function, and general artifact description. SCIAA curation 
standards were followed. All artifacts were placed in acid-free bags. These bags were 
labeled on the exterior with permanent ink. Labels included the site number, 
provenience, catalog number, quantity, and weight. A catalog description was also 
written on acid-free paper and inserted into each artifact bag. All artifact bags were 
packaged in one cubic foot acid-free cardboard boxes. The artifacts will be curated at 






Between 2004 and 2012 over two hundred (n=201) lead shot were recovered 
from all field investigations at Fort Motte (See Figure 7.1). Metal detector surveys 
conducted prior to 2012 located more than half of this total assemblage (n=108).  The 
majority of the previously recovered lead shot was found on the hill around the fort and 
its side slopes. Prior to 2012, a few lead shot (n=3) were also recovered from the hill to 
the northeast of Fort Motte (including Metal Detection Area 12). One of these was 
interpreted as part of the overseer’s house site (Area 12) where Henry Lee’s 
Continentals camped during the siege of Fort Motte (Smith et al. 2007: 23). 
Combined excavation and metal detection in May 2012 located additional lead 
shot (n=36). Recovery at this time focused on the area immediately surrounding Fort 
Motte (Metal Detection Areas 3, 5, and 6). However, these metal detection areas were 
expanded to include a larger section of the site, especially to the south of the fort. 
Additionally, a metal detection survey was again conducted in Area 12 (the overseer’s 
house site). At this time, Area 12 had been plowed and newly planted. Therefore, 
significantly more lead shot (n=14) was recovered from this area. 
The November 2012 metal detecting excursion recovered additional ammunition 
(n=57). Metal detection at this time focused on two different areas: 1) the area to the 
northeast of the fort defined as the ‘sap line’ based on previous finds of significant
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numbers of fired .75 cal. musket balls in an oval formation, and 2) the ridge to the 
southwest of Buckhead Hill (Metal  Detection Area 18). Area 18 had not been 
systematically surveyed in previous visits to the site. Thus, the data gathered from both 
Area 12 and Area 18 has allowed a clearer understanding of the Siege of Fort Motte as 
well as the overall history of the site.  
             
 




This thesis combines previously collected lead shot data with data collected from 
the May and November 2012 field excursions. The total assemblage of lead shot 
recovered from Fort Motte (n=201) was analyzed separately by location. In this chapter I 
will interpret the combined data based on close visual analysis, spatial distribution 
analysis, and weight/diameter analysis of all lead shot recovered from Fort Motte. I will 
first discuss major findings from the analysis of lead shot recovered in the immediate 
vicinity of the fort (Metal Detection Areas 3, 5, and 6) and will then briefly discuss 
findings regarding lead shot recovered from Area 12 and Area 18. 
7.1 Fort Motte (Metal Detection Areas 3, 5, and 6) 
The area in the immediate vicinity of Fort Motte is considered to be within two 
hundred meters of the fort moat in all directions and includes all of the 2005 and 2012 
excavation units and trenches as well as Metal Detection Areas 3, 5, and 6. During the 
analysis of lead shot recovered from this area, two major anomalies were observed. 
First, there was an unusually large quantity (n=35) of 15g/.54 caliber rifle balls in the 
assemblage. Second, several (n=6) fired .75 caliber musket balls were observed to show 
distinct evidence of minimal windage. As will be discussed below, both of these 
anomalies indicate individual sharpshooting activity that can be analyzed in terms of 
agency. 
These anomalies, based on lead shot data recovered prior to 2012, led to several 
hypotheses (Legg in Smith et al. 2007; Smith et al. 2007). First, it was thought that there 
was a significant percentage of lead shot that fell into one or two rifle caliber ranges, 
possibly indicating a rifleman sharpshooter. Second, a linear pattern of fired .75 caliber 
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shot was noticed to the northeast of the fort moat. Three of these musket balls showed 
distinct evidence of minimal windage, suggesting they were fired from a musket of a 
smaller caliber size (likely a .69 caliber musket). Additionally, due to the predominance 
of British fire in that area, it was hypothesized that the American sap was probably dug 
to the northeast of the fort moat (Legg in Smith et al. 2007; Smith et al. 2007).  
It is the aim of this thesis to clarify and reassess the aforementioned hypotheses 
and determine how these two anomalies show evidence of individual agency. To do so I 
will first briefly discuss the quantity and general distribution of all types of lead shot 
recovered from the immediate vicinity of Fort Motte and what this information can 
reveal about the Siege of Fort Motte. Second, I will focus specifically on an analysis of 
rifle balls and .75 caliber musket balls.  
General Lead Shot Assessment and Spatial Distribution Analysis 
A total of 151 lead shot were recovered from all Fort Motte excavations and 
Metal Detection Areas 3, 5, and 6. As seen in Table 7.1, these 151 lead shot were 
categorized based on visible surface characteristics such as evidence of rolling, patching, 
and rifling. The size and weight of the lead shot was also taken into consideration. This 
summary includes nine lead alloy balls, three cut balls, and six balls that have been 
heavily gnawed by rodents and are possibly underweight. Size and weight were 
estimated for these. All 151 lead shot from the area in the immediate vicinity of the fort 














Several types of lead shot were recovered: buckshot (n=12), rifle balls (n=84), 
carbine/trade gun12 balls (n=5), .65 or .67 caliber carbine or pistol balls (n=5), .69 caliber 
musket balls (n=7), and .75 caliber musket balls (n=38). The buckshot category includes 
nine fired and three unfired buckshot. The majority of the buckshot weighs between 2g 
and 4g. Fired buckshot was recovered around the fort moat as well as in the area to the 
northeast of the fort which was heavily detected (Figure 7.2). Unfired buckshot was only 
found outside of the fort moat (Figure 7.3). This indicates that the buckshot was fired as 
a part of the ‘buck and ball’ cartridges used by American forces besieging the fort. 
The rifle ball category includes 73 fired rifle balls, five unfired rifle balls, and five 
rifle balls that were heavily chewed and were unable to be categorized as fired or 
unfired. Rifle balls have a wide dispersion of weights; however, the majority of the rifle 
balls in this category weigh between 6g and 16g. The majority of the fired rifle balls 
                                                          
12
 Carbines and trade guns fired lead shot of approximately the same size: between 18 and 21 grams. 
Fort Motte (Areas 3, 5, and 6) Total Lead Shot 
Summary 
Ammunition Type Quantity 
Buckshot 12 
Rifle balls 84 
Trade gun / carbine balls 5 
.65 or .67 caliber carbine or .65 
caliber pistol balls 
5 
.69 caliber musket balls 7 




were located in and directly around the fort moat area. As shown in Figure 7.2, all fired 
rifle balls from Areas 3, 5, and 6 were found within 120 meters of the fort moat. 
Five fired rifle balls were recovered to the northeast of the fort along the area 
designated as the American sap line (See Figure 7.2). Several fired .75 caliber musket 
balls, identified as British fire (as will be discussed below), were recovered in this area, 
leading us to believe the main American assault came from this direction. The fact that 
there are fired rifle balls in this area may indicate that the British and Loyalist troops 
inside the fort had access to rifles. A closer analysis of these five rifle balls revealed that 
all five of the rifle balls vary in weight and diameter suggesting that they were all fired 
from different rifles.  
Three of the five unfired rifle balls were found inside the fort moat (Figure 7.3). 
Another was found to the northeast of the fort and the final unfired rifle ball was 
recovered on the southeastern edge of the moat. All five unfired rifle balls are of various 
calibers.  
The carbine/trade gun ball category includes three fired and two unfired balls. 
The three fired carbine/trade gun balls were all located along the ‘sap line’, indicating 
possible British fire (Figure 7.2). Both of the unfired carbine/trade gun balls were found 
within the fort moat, which also suggests British use of this type of firearm.  
The .65 or .67 caliber carbine or pistol ball category includes three fired, one 
unfired, and one probable .65 or .67 caliber carbine or pistol ball that was heavily hog 
chewed and therefore unable to be categorized as either fired or unfired.  One fired .65 
or .67 caliber carbine or pistol ball was recovered on the edge of the fort moat, while 
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the other two fired balls were recovered eighty meters northeast of the fort moat 
(Figure 7.2). The .69 caliber musket ball category includes six fired balls and one unfired 
ball. Three of the fired .69 caliber musket balls were recovered within and directly 
surrounding the fort moat and three were recovered between 80 and 100 meters to the 
northeast of the fort moat (Figure 7.2). The unfired .69 caliber musket ball was found 
just outside of the fort moat to the east of the fort. It is hypothesized that both sides 
had access to .69 caliber muskets during the siege.  
The .75 caliber musket ball category includes 29 fired and seven unfired musket 
balls. The vast majority (n=24) of the fired .75 caliber musket balls were recovered along 
the area designated as the ‘sap line’. However, three fired .75 caliber balls were 
recovered within 10 meters of the fort moat. It is uncertain whether these are the result 
of American or British/Loyalist fire. The unfired .75 caliber musket balls were all 
recovered inside or directly outside of the fort’s moat and may be evidence of British 
occupation of the area and and/or British or American use of .75 caliber muskets during 




  Figure 7.2 Fired Lead Shot by Type (Areas 3, 5, and 6) 
 




        
 





Total Weight/Diameter Analysis 
All 151 lead shot that could be categorized by type were included in the spatial 
analysis discussed above. However, only 134 of these balls were included in the 
weight/diameter analysis (Table 7.2). Lead alloy balls, cut balls, and lead shot that were 
considered underweight due to rodent gnawing were not included in the 
weight/diameter analysis. Additionally, one modern buckshot was not included in either 
count. 









Figure 7.4 shows the scatterplot chart for all of the lead shot included in the 
weight/diameter analysis and illustrates the close relationship between the weight and 
diameter of lead shot as a general trend line from buckshot on the far left to .75 caliber 
musket balls on the far right. This scatterplot also shows the two largest clusters of lead 
shot recovered from Fort Motte. First, the large quantity of rifle balls between 15g and 
15.9g. Second, the large number of .75 caliber musket balls. The isolated cluster to the 
Fort Motte (Areas 3, 5, and 6) Total Lead Shot 
Included in Weight/Diameter Analysis 
Ammunition Type Quantity 
Buckshot 11 
Rifle balls 73 
Trade gun / carbine balls 5 
.65 or .67 caliber carbine or .65 
caliber pistol balls 
3 
.69 caliber musket balls 6 




right, between 28g and 32g, shows the high degree of standardization of the .75 caliber 
musket balls recovered from Fort Motte.  
 
 Figure 7.4 Fort Motte total lead shot weight/diameter analysis 
 
 
Figure 7.5 shows the weight distribution chart for all of the Fort Motte lead shot 
included in the weight/diameter analysis. The two largest spikes in the weight/diameter 
analysis correspond with the two clusters discussed above. Both the clusters and the 
spikes correspond with the two anomalies discussed at the beginning of this chapter. 
The first spike represents the high number of 15.0g-15.9g lead shot that corresponds 
with the .54 caliber rifle ball anomaly. The second spike represents the high number of 

































 Figure 7.5 Fort Motte (Areas 3, 5, and 6) total lead shot distribution by weight 
 
 
7.2 RIFLE BALL ANALYSIS 
Based on the lead shot analysis conducted in 2007 (Smith et al. 2007) in addition 
to the current assessment, it is hypothesized that the 15g/.54 caliber cluster was 
created by the actions of one or two individuals. Clusters of rifle balls of very similar 
weights and diameters, within the context of a battle, may represent individual action. 
In order to assess the lead shot from the rifle ball category for evidence of other 
individual action, I conducted a close weight/diameter analysis solely of rifle balls to 
determine if other clusters could be seen. All 84 rifle balls listed in Table 7.1 were 
included in the spatial distribution analysis. However, only 73 of these were included in 
the weight/diameter analysis (Table 7.2). As is discussed above, eleven rifle balls were 
not included in the weight/diameter analysis due to certain pre- and post-depositional 


















Fort Motte (Areas 3, 5, and 6) Total 
Lead Shot Distribution by Weight 
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In addition to the 15g/.54 caliber cluster, two other clusters were noticed within 
the Fort Motte rifle ball assemblage. Seven rifle balls were recovered with weights 
between 6.0g and 6.9g. Additionally, eight rifle balls were recovered with weights 
between 14.0g and 14.9g. However, these clusters are dwarfed by the large cluster of 
rifle balls between 15.0g and 15.9g (n=35). The 15g/.54 caliber cluster is clearly evident, 
circled in red, in the rifle ball scatterplot shown in Figure 7.6. 
 
 Figure 7.6 Fort Motte rifle ball (Areas 3, 5, and 6) weight/diameter analysis 
 
 
The 15g/.54 caliber Rifle Ball Cluster: Evidence of Sharpshooters? 
In order to examine the 15g/.54 caliber cluster, I isolated these rifle balls and 
analyzed them separately. I conducted a comparative spatial analysis of these rifle balls 
as well as a specific weight/diameter analysis. Figure 7.7 shows a spatial comparison of 
the 15g (.54 caliber) rifle balls to all other rifle balls recovered in the immediate vicinity 
of the fort. All of the .54 caliber rifle balls (n=35) were fired and the majority (n=27) 






























caliber rifle balls the impact material is unknown. The close proximity of the .54 caliber 
rifle balls to the fort and the fact that many of these balls struck wood indicates that 
they were fired at the fort. Based on a spatial analysis of the .54 caliber balls (Figure 
7.7), the 15g/.54 caliber cluster is most likely the result of American fire during the siege 
of Fort Motte. 
The majority of the .54 caliber rifle balls are within forty meters of the fort moat. 
Two of the .54 caliber balls are significantly farther from the fort (approximately 100 
meters). It is asserted here that these distant rifle balls are the result of either fired balls 
that missed their mark or fired balls that ricocheted off the fort palisade or the Motte 
house. Such occurrences certainly explain the relatively small distance from the fort. It is 
hypothesized that rifle balls that missed their mark could travel up to 200-300 meters. 
As a comparison, Figure 7.7 also includes all other calibers of rifle balls as a single 
category. The category encompassing all other rifle balls in the Fort Motte assemblage 
includes four unfired and thirty-one fired balls. Additionally, this category includes three 
rifle balls that were significantly hog chewed or deliberately mutilated or flattened. Such 
mutilation did not remove any mass from the lead shot; however, for these shot it was 
impossible to tell whether or not they had been fired. Of the thirty-one fired rifle balls in 
the category of all other rifle balls, five had a sand impact, twenty-two showed evidence 
of wood impact, and for the remaining four the type of material impacted was unable to 












Of the thirty-five rifle balls in the 15g/.55” cluster, the majority (n=28) of them 
weigh between 15.1g and 15.4g. Figure 7.8 shows the weight distribution within the 15g 
range. This chart depicts rifle balls from 14.9g to 16.1g to ensure a complete assessment 
of the cluster.  
 
Figure 7.8 15g rifle ball distribution by weight 
 
Within the 15g/.55” cluster, the lead shot was able to be divided into three sub-
categories: rifled, smoothbore, and indeterminate. Six lead shot from the 15g cluster 
showed evidence of being fired from a rifled firearm, 15 showed evidence of being fired 
from a smoothbore firearm, and the 17 remaining balls were indeterminate. These 
categories represent the active presence of at least two .54 caliber firearms at Fort 
Motte; one firearm with rifling and the other without. The smoothbore balls show 
evidence of patching as well as minimal windage; therefore, they are considered to be 




















15g Rifle Ball Distribution by Weight 
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firearm was treated as and utilized in the same manner as a rifled rifle. It shall hereafter 
be denoted as a smoothbore rifle. 
When the sub-categories of rifled and smoothbore are taken into consideration 
using the weight/diameter analysis, it is shown that the weight range for rifled balls is 
15.0g-15.3g, and the weight range for smoothbore balls is 15.1g-16.1g (see Figure 7.9). 
Due to the sample size for the balls that definitively show evidence of rifling (n=6) and 
the relatively wide weight range of the smoothbore balls, it is impossible to determine if 
two separate clusters could be identified within the 15g/.54 caliber cluster solely by 
means of a weight/diameter analysis. 
 
            Figure 7.9 15g/.54 caliber rifle balls by type 
 
 
A spatial analysis of the .54 caliber rifle balls by type (Figure 7.10) shows that 



























shot, as well as cut lead shot with evidence of rifling, were included in this general 
spatial analysis. 
 




Comparison of Fort Motte .54 caliber Rifle Data with Other Revolutionary War Site Data 
It has been stated that during the time of the American Revolution, the most 
common caliber for American rifles was approximately .54 caliber (Moller 1993: 178-
180; Smith et al. 2007: 55). This would make 15g/.54 caliber the most common size of 
rifle balls at the time.  It is possible that the 15g cluster seen at Fort Motte is only a 
material result of popular use of .54 caliber rifles. To test this possibility it is necessary 
to compare the lead shot data from Fort Motte with lead shot data from other 
Revolutionary War sites. This comparison is necessary to determine if the ‘anomaly’ 
seen in the Fort Motte data is truly an anomaly or if it is simply a representation of 
popular use of a specific caliber firearm.  
In order to maintain an accurate cultural comparison, since the war in the 
northern colonies was fought in a different manner than the war in the south, the Fort 
Motte assemblage was only compared to data from other battlefields and military sites 
in South Carolina. I will compare the Fort Motte data to other sites where Francis 
Marion’s riflemen were in action. These include Fort Watson, Dunham’s Bluff, Wadboo 
Plantation, Black Mingo, and Black Mingo North. As discussed in Chapter 3, Fort Watson 
was constructed by the British in December 1780 and occupied through April 23, 1781.  
The Dunham’s Bluff site is associated with Francis Marion’s camp at Snow’s 
Island (Smith 2009: 12). It was occupied from August 1780 through March 1781 and the 
Battle of Snow’s Island occurred sometime at the end of March 1781. This site was a 
permanent camp for Marion and his forces as well as American supporters and generally 
represents a more domestic and civilian culture. 
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The battle at Black Mingo took place on September 28, 1780. Marion dispersed a 
post of Loyalist militia at Dollard’s Tavern along Black Mingo Creek (Smith et al. 2008: 
39). This victory provided Marion’s men with ammunition and muskets. The area across 
the river to the northwest of the Black Mingo battle site (Black Mingo North site) was 
also used as a Revolutionary War militia camp site. Smith et al. (2008: 45) have asserted 
that this camp site could be Marion’s camp from November 1780 or it could be a 
Loyalist camp occupied during 1782.  
The skirmish at Wadboo Plantation occurred on August 29, 1782. Marion and his 
troops had occupied the abandoned plantation as a temporary camp. British troops 
under the command of British Major Thomas Fraser attacked the plantation (Smith et al. 
2008).  
As discussed in Chapter 3, Francis Marion was not the only American partisan 
leader to utilize riflemen in combat. Therefore, Revolutionary War sites where Francis 
Marion was not present were also compared to the Fort Motte assemblage, including 
Williamson’s Plantation and Hickory Hill. As described in Chapter 3, the battle at 
Williamson’s Plantation, popularly known as the Battle of Huck’s Defeat, took place on 
July 12, 1780. Additional information on these sites can be found in Scoggins et al. 
(2011); Smith et al. (2008); Smith et al. (2009). 
All of the sites mentioned above were excavated by archaeologists from SCIAA. 
Jim Legg originally analyzed all the ammunition from each of these sites (Scoggins 2011; 
Smith et al. 2008; Smith 2009). After excavation, the lead shot was uniformly weighed, 
measured, and inspected for other characteristics. I examined the rifle ammunition data 
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in order to determine if certain clusters of weight/diameter ranges could be seen, 
specifically focusing on the 15.0-15.9g weight range for a comparison with the Fort 
Motte data.  
As in my weight/diameter analysis involving the Fort Motte data, I removed lead 
alloy and pewter rifle balls as well as cut shot from this analysis. First, I will individually 
analyze the lead shot data from each site and second, I will combine this data in order to 
more effectively compare it to the Fort Motte rifle ball anomaly. 
The rifle balls in the Fort Watson assemblage (n=38) showed evidence of four 
small clusters13 (see Figure 7.11). The greatest number of rifle balls weighed between 
10.0g and 10.9g (n=6) and between 15.0 and 15.9g (n=6). Additionally, five rifle balls 
were documented within the 11.0g - 11.9g range and four rifle balls weighed between 
12.0g and 12.5g (Figure 7.11).  
 
 
 Figure 7.11 Fort Watson rifle ball distribution by weight 
                                                          
13
 This evidence corresponds to the historical account of three to four riflemen sharpshooters firing from 
























The Williamson’s Plantation data yielded thirty-seven rifle balls. In this case, the 
largest cluster (n=5) is seen in the 15.0-15.9g weight range. However, Figure 7.12 shows 
that the 4.0-4.9g, 5.0-5.9g, and 7.0-7.9g weight ranges each include four rifle balls. 
Therefore, it appears that the .54 caliber rifle did not have a dominant role in the 
military action at this site.  
 
Figure 7.12 Williamson’s Plantation rifle ball distribution by weight 
 
 
The majority of the Wadboo Plantation site ammunition are rifle balls (n=47), 
“suggestive of Marion’s riflemen” (Smith 2008: 15). The weight range between 15.0g-
15.9g is populated with seven rifle balls (Figure 7.13). The Wadboo assemblage also 
shows a strong cluster between 5.0g and 5.9g (n=8). 
Black Mingo yielded twenty rifle balls for this analysis. Similar to the Wadboo 
Plantation assemblage, the Black Mingo assemblage does not show 15g/.54 caliber as 
the most common size (Figure 7.14). The greatest quantity of rifle balls instead were 















Williamson's Plantation Rifle Ball 
Distribution by Weight 
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15.0g-15.9g weight range was the second most populated (n=3); however, this is not 
especially significant due to the small sample size. 
 




Figure 7.14 Black Mingo rifle ball distribution by weight 
 
 
The lead shot from Dunham’s Bluff also yielded 20 rifle balls for this analysis; 
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Hickory Hill and the eight rifle balls analyzed from Black Mingo North showed no 
significant clusters. This is likely due to the small sample size of lead shot collected from 
each of these sites.  
In order to compare the Fort Motte assemblage to a much larger sample size, an 
amalgamation of lead shot data (Table 7.3) was created, utilizing the totality of rifle ball 
data gathered from these seven sites (Figure 7.15). This amalgamation includes 183 rifle 
balls. The combined data was used to compare general trends in the use of rifled 
firearms and lead shot during the time of the American Revolution to the anomaly seen 
at Fort Motte.  
Figure 7.15 shows that for the combined data from the seven aforementioned 
sites, the 15.0-15.9g weight range is indeed the most populated (n=26).  It is significant 
that while the 15g weight range is the most abundant in this amalgamation of lead shot 
data, the Fort Motte data from this same range is higher still (n=35). This fact demands 
attention and suggests that the anomaly at Fort Motte cannot be explained simply by a 
general trend in rifle calibers at the time of the American Revolution. The Fort Motte .54 
caliber rifle data most likely represents specific sharpshooting behavior of at least two 






























3 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
4 2 4 0 0 0 3 1 10 
5 8 4 1 0 0 0 1 14 
6 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 3 
7 3 4 1 0 0 0 0 8 
8 1 2 0 1 0 0 2 6 
9 2 2 0 0 2 2 3 11 
10 2 2 1 1 0 0 6 12 
11 5 2 0 1 1 0 5 14 
12 0 3 0 2 1 2 4 12 
13 5 2 1 5 0 2 3 18 
14 2 3 1 3 2 2 2 15 
15 7 5 2 2 1 3 6 26 
16 3 1 1 1 0 0 2 8 
17 4 1 1 0 1 3 1 11 
18 2 0 2 2 0 2 0 8 
19 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
20 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
         





Figure 7.15 Total rifle ball distribution by weight for seven Revolutionary War 
sites in South Carolina 
 
7.3 .75 CALIBER MUSKET BALL ANALYSIS  
 
The second largest spike in the Fort Motte data is caused by the numerous 
(n=34) .75 caliber musket balls in the lead shot assemblage. Of these thirty-four musket 
balls, five were unfired. Additionally, three of the unfired .75 caliber musket balls 
showed evidence of being rolled (Legg in Smith et al. 2007: I-6). As discussed in Chapter 
3, rolled balls are indicative of the British manufacturing process (Legg et al. 2005; Legg 
in Smith et al. 2007: I-6). In the Fort Motte assemblage only one .75 caliber musket ball 
showed distinct evidence of non-British ammunition production and thus was identified 
as atypical. Figure 7.16 shows that both the mold seam and the sprue cut are visible on 
the atypical ball. This musket ball was unfired and recovered within the fort moat. This 


















Total Rifle Ball Distribution by Weight for Seven 




                                 
 
           Figure 7.16 Atypical .75 caliber musket ball 
 
 
Twenty-seven of the fired .75 caliber musket balls showed evidence of normal 
windage. Five of these .75 caliber musket balls had a wood impact. As Figure 7.17 
shows, all five were recovered inside the fort moat or in the immediate vicinity of the 
fort moat area. Therefore, these five balls may be evidence of American use of .75 
caliber musket(s). However, the majority of the fired .75 caliber musket balls showing 
evidence of normal windage (n=22) had a sand impact. All but three of the sand 
impacted .75 caliber balls were recovered in a linear formation to the northeast of the 
fort (Figure 7.17). The fact that the majority of the fired .75 caliber musket balls with 
normal windage show evidence of a sand impact, taken in conjunction with the spatial 
distribution data, indicates that the majority of fired .75 caliber shot recovered at Fort 









In the summer of 2013, as this thesis was being written, archaeologists from 
SCIAA returned to Fort Motte and dug five trenches perpendicular to the linear 
formation of fired .75 caliber musket balls in an attempt to locate the sap. Portions of 
the sap were located and can be seen in Figure 7.17 as sets of dark red parallel 
rectangular points. Based on spatial analysis of these points, the sap appears to have 
been dug in a zig-zag pattern, with at least two extreme turns. 
.75 caliber Musket Balls with Evidence of Minimal Windage: Evidence of Sharpshooting? 
 
In addition to the normal windage .75 caliber musket balls, a total of six .75 
caliber musket balls were recovered with a heavy barrel mark, which is indicative of 
minimal windage (Figure 7.18 and Figure 7.19). These six musket balls account for the 
second anomaly within the Fort Motte assemblage. All six minimal windage .75 caliber 
musket balls have a sand impact and were located along the sap line. These are 
represented as large red circular points in Figure 7.17. It is hypothesized that these balls 
were rammed into and fired from a .69 caliber musket in an attempt to achieve greater 
accuracy and distance. Because they were recovered along the sap line, the shooter was 
likely aiming at the American diggers in an attempt to impede their assault on the fort.  
In order to more closely analyze the British .75 caliber musket balls recovered 
from Fort Motte, a weight/diameter analysis of the .75 caliber shot was conducted. This 
analysis revealed only one major outlier from the group; this was the musket ball 
defined as atypical (Figure 7.20). However, three other .75 caliber musket balls were 




          
Figure 7.18 A .75 caliber musket ball with          Figure 7.19 Very heavy barrel mark 





Figure 7.20 .75 caliber musket ball weight/diameter analysis 
 
 
I then added data highlighting the rolled balls (Figure 7.21), supposing that these 
would probably fall along the main trend line, and that perhaps the slight outliers might 
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three rolled musket balls were slight outliers from the group. These outliers are only 
slightly heavier for their size, however. Thus, the difference between the main trend line 
and the slight outliers may be able to be understood as normal variability for British .75 
caliber musket balls.  
Additionally, data was added highlighting the six .75 caliber musket balls with 
minimal windage (Figure 7.21). All six of these musket balls fell along the major trend 
line for .75 caliber musket balls. Therefore, the individual firing these balls was very 
probably utilizing British manufactured .75 caliber shot and was almost certainly a 
British soldier or a Loyalist.   
 




7.3 OTHER EVIDENCE OF INDIVIDUAL ACTION 
While I focused my analysis on the two major anomalies discussed above, other 




















.75 caliber Musket Ball Weight/Diameter Analysis Based 
on Surface Characteristics 









discussed below: 1) ramrod marks on fired lead balls, and 2) the distribution of iron 
canister shot.  
Ramrod Marks 
During the lead shot analysis two sets of distinctive ramrod marks were found. 
These offer comparative data for the analysis of clusters and their interpretation as 
individual action because each set was almost certainly fired from the same firearm and 
likely by the same individual. The first distinctive ramrod mark is an indentation that has 
the appearance of a capital H (Figure 7.22 and 7.23). This ‘H’ mark is present on two rifle 
balls, both from the 15g/.54 caliber cluster. Both of these rifle balls were indeterminate 
for rifling or smoothbore barrel marks. Both have a distinct uncut or roughly cut sprue. 
Both H mark balls were recovered to the southwest of the fort less than twenty meters 
apart (Figure 7.24). During a close inspection and comparison of these two rifle balls, it 
was determined that the mark on 03.009.001 is larger than the mark on 03.027.001. The 
difference in size is likely due to the distortion of the ball during the firing process.  
          
Figure 7.22 H Ramrod Mark on       Figure 7.23 H Ramrod Mark on   





A rough ramrod mark was also found on two carbine or trade gun size balls. Both 
were composed of lead, one weighing 19.3g and the other weighing 20.0g. This mark 
may have been produced by a dirty or rusted ramrod, although these hypotheses are 
only speculative. Because of the almost identical ramrod marks on these two balls as 
well as their similar weights, it is highly probable that they were fired from the same 
carbine or trade gun, likely by the same individual. These balls were recovered twenty-
five meters apart and approximately seventy meters to the northeast of the fort (see 
Figure 7.24). This location lies along the American sap line. Therefore, it is possible that 
the shooter was British or Loyalist and was firing at the American sap. This data 
understood in conjunction with the spatial distribution of unfired carbine/trade gun 
balls discussed previously (Figure 7.3), indicates that the British utilized at least one 
carbine or trade gun during the siege of Fort Motte.  
Iron Canister 
Although iron canister clearly does not fit into the category of lead shot, it is 
appropriate to discuss such artifacts and analyze them here as they are the only other 
type of ammunition recovered from the Fort Motte battlefield. Despite the active 
presence of an American artillery piece during the Battle of Fort Motte, only five iron 
canister balls have been recovered archaeologically. The relative lack of canister is 
undoubtedly due to the active presence of relic collectors at the site since the 
eighteenth century. Two canister shot were found in previous metal detection work 
(Area 3 and Area 6), one was found during the May 2012 excavation in Unit 23 (N512 
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E558 & 559), one was recovered in November 2012 metal detection in the area of the 
sap line (Area 3), and one found as this thesis was being written (2013 excavation within 
the fort). Figure 7.25 shows the GPS locations of recovered canister shot in relation to a 
1948 photograph. 
Although the exact position of the artillery mound cannot be seen on the present 
landscape, aerial photographs of the area from 1937 and 1948 clearly show the mound 
area approximately 200 meters east of Fort Motte. The presence of the artillery mound 
on the historic landscape as well as the recovery of five iron canister shot from the Fort 
Motte battlefield can be viewed as evidence for the individual action and leadership of 














  Figure 7.25 1948 aerial photograph detailing the spatial distribution of canister at Fort   




7.4 OTHER METAL DETECTION AREAS 
Although this thesis focused on two major anomalies in the area in the 
immediate vicinity of the fort moat (Metal Detection Areas 3, 5, and 6), a total lead shot 
analysis was conducted and included the entirety of the Fort Motte assemblage. The 
findings from the two other areas investigated in 2012 (Area 12 and Area 18) are briefly 
discussed below. Information on all previous Metal Detection Areas can be found in 
Smith et al. (2007: 38-39). Additionally, a catalog detailing the entire lead shot 
assemblage recovered between 2005 and 2012 can be found in Appendix A.  
Metal Detection Area 12 
Area 12 is located on the southeast portion of the unnamed hill northeast of Fort 
Motte. This area has been identified as the overseer’s house site. A total of fourteen 
lead shot were recovered from Area 12. Two of the balls had been cut, however, and 
only rifle balls (n=10) and trade gun/carbine balls (n=2) could be positively identified 
from the lead shot recovered from this area. It is uncertain whether the lead shot 
recovered from Area 12 is the result of the American encampment during the siege of 
Fort Motte (Lee 1869: 345; Smith et al. 2007: 23) or the result of domestic site related 
slaughtering practices and hunting. However, this site was certainly occupied during the 
time of the American Revolution.  
Twelve lead shot were included in the weight/diameter analysis for Area 12. The 
weight/diameter analysis shows a small cluster of four rifle balls between 16.0 and 
17.0g. All of these were fired and show evidence of either wood or bone impacts. A 
14.8g/.548” rifle ball and a 19.2g/.598” trade gun ball also show evidence of bone 
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Weight/Diameter Analysis of Lead 
Shot from Area 12 (Overseer's House)  
Area 12 (overseer’s house site) Total Lead 
Shot Summary 
Ammunition Type Quantity 
Buckshot 0 
Rifle balls 10 
Trade gun / carbine balls 2 
.65 or .67 caliber carbine or .65 
caliber pistol balls 
0 
.69 caliber musket balls 0 





Figure 7.27 Lead shot weight distribution for Area 12 (overseer’s house) 
 
 
Metal Detection Area 18 
Area 18 is located on the ridge west of Fort Motte and has tentatively been 
identified as a possible American camp site. A total of twenty-three lead shot and one 
lead alloy ball were recovered from this area. The majority of the ammunition has been 
categorized as buckshot (n=14). Most of the buckshot were unfired and are considered 
dropped (n=13). This is suggestive of a camp occupation. One .75 caliber musket ball, 
three .69 caliber musket balls, one trade gun or carbine ball, and five rifle balls 
(including one composed of lead alloy) were also recovered from Area 18. 
One melted piece of lead and the one lead alloy rifle ball were not included in a 
weight/diameter analysis. However, the lead alloy rifle ball was included in the overall 
count of lead shot (Table 7.5). The weight/diameter analysis of the Area 18 data did not 
reveal any significant clusters except for the concentration of buckshot between 2.0g 




















Lead Shot Weight Distribution for 
Area 12 (Overseer's House) 
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Area 18 (camp site) Total Lead Shot Summary 
Ammunition Type Quantity 
Buckshot 14 
Rifle balls 5 
Trade gun / carbine balls 1 
.65 or .67 caliber carbine or .65 
caliber pistol balls 
0 
.69 caliber musket balls 3 







The siege of Fort Motte took place May 6-12, 1781, at a small British post in the 
South Carolina backcountry. This battle was not an isolated event. It was embedded in 
the political, cultural, tactical and technological dynamics of the mid-eighteenth century. 
Both British and American forces primarily favored linear tactics at this time. The 
majority of firearms used were muskets, with rifles and other firearms being utilized in 
secondary roles in specific contexts. The siege of Fort Motte was fought according to the 
general rules of warfare at this time. The Americans, made up of Francis Marion’s 
militiamen and Henry Lee’s Continentals, utilized sharpshooters while digging a sap 
close to the fort. The British, Hessian, and Loyalist defenders also utilized sharpshooting 
techniques to defend the fort. None of these general actions are abnormal within the 
context of eighteenth century warfare. However, the manner in which these actions 
were carried out can be analyzed in terms of individual agency, as this thesis has 
demonstrated. 
For this thesis, I conducted a detailed analysis of the ammunition recovered from 
the Fort Motte site between 2004 and 2012. I specifically focused my analysis on lead 
shot, conducting a general surface analysis, weight/diameter analysis, and spatial
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distribution analysis to best examine the assemblage in terms of individual combat 
behavior.  
Two anomalies were explored further during this analysis. First, a high quantity 
of .54 caliber rifle balls was observed. Such a single large cluster has not been seen in 
lead shot assemblages before, even at Fort Watson where there is significant historical 
documentation of the active presence of several riflemen sharpshooters (Ferguson 
1973; MacKay 1781), and denotes specific sharpshooting behavior. This cluster was 
compared to lead shot assemblages from seven other Revolutionary War military sites. 
Despite the most common range of rifle caliber during the mid-eighteenth century being 
between .50 and .55 caliber (Legg in Smith et al. 2007: 55), the .54 caliber cluster at Fort 
Motte remained significant in its own right. Within the .54 caliber cluster, two distinct 
types of firearms were involved: a rifle and a ‘smoothbore rifle.’ Therefore, this anomaly 
can be interpreted as evidence for the individual sharpshooting activity of at least two 
individuals.  
Second, six .75 caliber musket balls were observed to show evidence of minimal 
windage. Such material evidence has not been seen in lead shot assemblages before and 
denotes specific sharpshooting behavior. All of the minimal windage balls were 
recovered along the sap line and had sand impacts. Because of their location along the 
sap line with the majority of .75 caliber musket balls, these balls are interpreted as being 
fired by a British soldier or a Loyalist from within the fort who was acting as a 




8.2 INDIVIDUAL COMBAT BEHAVIOR DURING THE SIEGE OF FORT MOTTE 
 Several individuals can be seen in the Fort Motte ammunition data. These 
include at least two American riflemen sharpshooters (whose fired balls make up the 
15g/.54 caliber cluster), the British or Loyalist sharpshooter (firing .75 caliber shot from 
a .69 caliber musket), the two individuals using distinctly identifiable ramrods, and the 
American artillery officer.  
American Riflemen 
Using the historical data regarding American riflemen at Fort Motte, it is likely 
that one or maybe both of the individuals whose efforts made up the .54 caliber cluster 
can be identified. Two American casualties were sustained during the Siege of Fort 
Motte: Lieutenant Allen MacDonald14 and Lieutenant Cruger15 (Smith et al. 2007: 26-27). 
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, MacDonald was renowned for his ability as a 
sharpshooter. Prior to his death at Fort Motte, he had been noted, as a sergeant, for 
courage and bravery as well as his extremely accurate long-distance shots (Bass 1959: 
150). “He was a native of Cross creek, in North-Carolina, and his father and other 
relations had espoused the opposite side of the cause” (James 1821: 121). Prior to the 
Siege of Fort Motte, MacDonald had been advanced to a lieutenancy (James 1821: 121). 
James (1821: 121) writes that MacDonald was killed “At the commencement of this 
siege.” However, as the siege lasted six days, it is uncertain how long into the battle 
MacDonald survived.  
                                                          
14
 Spelled McDonald in James (1821: 121) 
15
 Possibly same as Lieutenant Cryer in James (1821: 121) 
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The other casualty, a Lieutenant Cruger (or Cryer) is associated with MacDonald. 
James (1821: 121) states that “Lieut. Cryer, who had often emulated McDonald, shared 
a similar fate” at Fort Motte. Perhaps MacDonald acted as a sharpshooter until he was 
killed, then another gunman (possibly Cryer) took his place. Perhaps MacDonald and 
another gunman (possibly Cryer) acted as sharpshooters simultaneously. There is also 
the possibility that McDonald was not involved in sharpshooting during the Siege of Fort 
Motte; however, due to his previous sharpshooting reputation and flare for bravado 
(Bass 1959: 150), it seems unlikely that he would have remained uninvolved.  
Furthermore, given that the British were behind a significant fortification and 
that the only means of capturing the fort involved a siege, sharpshooting to keep the 
British within the fort walls and to protect the sap diggers was a logical and effective 
siege tactic. It is highly unlikely that Marion, who often made use of riflemen, would 
forego MacDonald’s skill at Fort Motte. 
Additionally, Bass (1959: 194) states that these fatalities (MacDonald and Cryer) 
were regarded as “considerable losses” for Marion. While Marion would undoubtedly 
have regretted any losses sustained in battle, the term “considerable losses” suggests a 
closer relationship. It has been suggested that Francis Marion frequently utilized 
riflemen sharpshooters and relied heavily on a group of loyal and highly-skilled riflemen, 
specifically McCottry’s riflemen (Bass 1959; James 1821). MacDonald and Cryer may 






The six minimal windage .75 caliber balls recovered from the sap line area also 
indicate individual action. While it is not possible to infer the exact historical identity of 
this individual, it may be possible to deduce certain identifiers based on his knowledge 
of firearm technology and action within the structure of eighteenth century military 
culture. Someone within the fort acted as a sharpshooter, firing .75 caliber musket balls 
from a .69 caliber musket to achieve the same proximal accuracy as firing with a rifle. 
Based on the structural conditions present in the mid-eighteenth century in the 
backcountry and along the frontier, it is most likely that this individual was a Loyalist 
rather than a British soldier. While the British were certainly familiar with rifles, a close 
familiarity was not common among the ranks of infantrymen. Therefore, it is likely that 
this individual was a resident of the colonial backcountry where knowledge and use of 
such firearms was more commonplace.  
Individuals with Distinctive Ramrods 
As discussed in Chapter 7, two distinct ramrod marks were observed during my 
lead shot analysis: an ‘H’ mark and a rough mark. Based on the size of the ‘H’ mark rifle 
balls, they are likely the result of fire by one of the .54 caliber American sharpshooters 
discussed above. The two balls with a rough ramrod mark are both of carbine/trade gun 
ball size and were recovered from the sap line area. It is uncertain whether these balls 
were fired by an individual besieging or defending Fort Motte. In order to be able to 
interpret this individual action, a complete metal detection survey of the entire field 
surrounding the fort would be necessary in order to gain additional data.  
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American Artillery Officer  
The leadership actions of Captain Ebenezer Finley, the American artillery officer, 
can be seen in the distribution of iron canister shot recovered between 2004 and 2013 
(n=5). A total metal detection survey of the field surrounding Fort Motte would also 
reveal a more complete picture of Captain Finley’s involvement in the siege. However, 
his action during the siege and the placement of the six-pounder significantly 
contributed to the American victory. Without the American artillery piece, the British 
may have been able to extinguish the flames on the roof of the Motte house and the 
siege may have had a different outcome.  
8.3 INDIVIDUAL AGENCY 
Johnson (1989: 190) states that “it is an oversimplification and a misconception 
to confuse the search for human agency with the archaeological identification of 
individuals.” However, he supports the possibility that both could be studied in a 
specific situation. Johnson (1989: 190) goes on to assert that “the use of ‘individuals’ 
known through the documents offers one means of attaining the end of tackling the 
theoretical question of ‘the individual.’” 
While very interesting, the individual action of Ebenezer Finley and the two 
individuals using distinctly identifiable ramrods, cannot be analyzed in terms of 
individual agency based on the data presented in this thesis. Therefore, the following 
discussion of agency will focus on the two American riflemen whose efforts produced 
the .54 caliber cluster, Francis Marion (based on his leadership and tactical decisions 
136 
 
documented in historical sources), and the British/Loyalist sharpshooter firing .75 
caliber balls from a .69 caliber musket.   
A soldier ideally fought within the culturally accepted structure of war and with 
certain fighting techniques that were socially imposed upon him; however this does not 
insinuate that individuals acted in a pre-ordained manner. Soldiers and militiamen of 
the mid-eighteenth century were not unthinking puppets of the larger cultural 
structure. It is important to emphasize that for every action, an individual chose to act as 
he did, utilizing his cultural, technological, tactical, and personal knowledge to achieve a 
certain goal. It is also critical to stress that at any given time, an individual could have 
chosen to act differently.  
The two American .54 caliber rifle sharpshooters chose to act within cultural and 
technological norms in their attempt to immobilize the defenders within the fort. 
Although their attempts may not have worked as intended, the actions of these men did 
contribute to the overall outcome of the siege.  
  Robb (2010: 501) states that agency involves individuals acting creatively, 
“varying what they do to accomplish a proximate intention.” Agency may be based in 
habit and regular action, but it also involves creative intention in the manner that it is 
carried out. Francis Marion’s actions can also be understood in terms of agency. It can 
be argued that Francis Marion’s decision to maintain a group of loyal and skilled 
riflemen was a selective tactical response to the nature of partisan warfare in the 
backcountry of South Carolina as well as the practical application of available resources 
including rifles, skilled riflemen, and the forested environment. It is known that Marion 
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decried the unreliability of the militia and that he preferred to command regular 
soldiers who could be relied upon to remain in the ranks for the entire course of the war 
(Smith, pers.com. October 4, 2013). In a siege situation at both Fort Watson and Fort 
Motte, Marion adapted to the tactical situation present within the context of eighteenth 
century warfare; the archaeological evidence suggests that he relied not only on 
riflemen, but two particularly skilled sharpshooters.  
The individual combat behavior evidenced by the six minimal windage balls can 
also be analyzed as intentional alternative action. As the lead shot analysis suggests 
(Chapter 7), the defenders within the fort may have had access to a rifle. Regardless of 
this detail, the defending sharpshooter (likely a Loyalist) who fired the minimal windage 
.75 caliber musket balls hoped to achieve the same goal as firing a rifle, within the social 
and technological constraints that were in effect during the siege.  
In his discussion of combat tactics used during the American Revolution, 
Stephenson (2007: xxiii) stated that “there were no technical or tactical innovations on 
the battlefield.” However, such a statement is nullified by the evidence observed at Fort 
Motte. The Loyalist shooter intentionally rammed a .75 caliber ball into a .69 caliber 
musket, knowing that such an adjustment would increase the distance and accuracy of 
his projected fire. Therefore, he selectively utilized his knowledge of firearm technology 
and military culture in order to more accurately aim at further distances. As discussed 
above, one or both of the American sharpshooters may have been shot and killed during 
the siege. Knowing that these individuals were practiced and skilled at sharpshooting 
and likely utilizing irregular tactics speaks to the prowess and ability of the defending 
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Loyalist sharpshooter. He was able to achieve his proximate goal to such an extent as to 
possibly eliminate the two major American protagonists. 
Ultimately, my detailed lead shot analysis has allowed for a much more 
comprehensive assessment of the siege of Fort Motte. While certainly not exhaustive, 
this thesis presents evidence for several instances of individual combat behavior during 
the siege. I have attempted to analyze this behavior in terms of individual agency within 
a larger context of military culture. Individual combat behavior was assessed in terms of 
proximal goals and motives while situating individual agents within the framework of 
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Table A.1 Fort Motte Lead Shot (Metal Detection Areas 3, 5, and 6 and unit excavation) 
Ammunition Type Weight Diameter Projected? Fired? Impact Provenience Composition Additional Information 
buckshot 1.9 0.276 yes fired  03.081.001 lead  
buckshot 2.2 0.29 yes fired  03.287.001 lead period buckshot, probably 
from a "buck and ball" 
cartridge 
buckshot 2.3 0.295 yes fired  03.289.001 lead period buckshot 
buckshot 2.5 0.303 yes fired  03.281.001 lead  
buckshot 2.7 0.311 yes fired  03.291.001 lead period buckshot 
buckshot 3 0.345 no unfired  03.095.001 lead incomplete  casting 
buckshot 3 0.322 yes fired  03.255.001 lead cast, with mold seam 
buckshot 3.1 0.325 yes fired sand 03.032.001 lead  
buckshot 3.3 0.334 no unfired  03.054.001 lead very irregular mold 
buckshot 3.7 0.345 yes fired wood 03.039.001 lead  
buckshot 3.7 0.345 yes fired wood 03.115.001 lead  
probable rifle ball 4.6 0.376 no unfired  03.076.001 lead powder corrosion 
probable rifle ball 5.4 0.391 yes fired wood 05.005.001 lead  
probable rifle ball 6.2 0.395 no unfired  03.107.001 lead somewhat oblong (height is 
.432") 
probable rifle ball 6.2 0.41 yes fired wood 03.148.001 lead possible wood fibers in lead 
(?) 
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate) 
6.3 0.412 yes fired sand 03.057.001 lead slight rodent gnawing, a 
somewhat cylindrical ball, 
about .380" diameter, but 
length about .450" 
probable rifle ball 6.3 0.412 yes fired wood 03.079.001 lead ball began to turn inside out 






Ammunition Type Weight Diameter Projected? Fired? Impact Provenience Composition Additional Information 
probable rifle ball 6.5 0.416 yes   03.207.001  deliberately flattened ball 
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate)  
6.7 0.413 no unfired  03.004.001 lead  sprue cut and mold seam 
visible 
rifle ball (rifled) 6.9 0.424 yes fired wood 03.051.001 lead patch marks and rifling visible 
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate)  
7.6 0.438 yes   03.003.001 lead  hog chewed 
rifle ball (rifled) 8.6 0.457 yes fired sand 03.280.001 lead patched rifling marks 
rifle ball 8.8 0.46 yes fired wood 03.061.001 lead patch marks 
probable rifle ball 9.1 0.466 yes fired wood 03.183.001 lead  
probable rifle ball 9.3 0.469 yes fired sand (?) 03.224.001   
probable rifle ball 10.2 0.484 yes fired wood 03.247.001 lead clear wood grain visible 
rifle ball 
(indeterminate) 
10.5 0.488 yes fired wood 03.060.001 lead two corrosion blisters, patch 
marks 
probable rifle ball 10.8 0.493 yes fired wood 03.197.001 lead very clear wood impact, gas 
hole on sprue cut 
rifle ball (rifled) 11.2 0.499 yes fired wood 03.005.001 lead  rifling marks, slight rodent 
gnawing 
probable rifle ball 12.2 0.514 yes   03.192.001 lead extensively hog chewed 
(recent) 
probable rifle ball 12.5 0.518 yes fired wood 03.168.001  possible patch mark 
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate) 
12.7 0.521 yes fired  03.278.001 lead chewed, no surface detail 







Ammunition Type Weight Diameter Projected? Fired? Impact Provenience Composition Additional Information 
rifle ball 13.3 0.528 yes fired  03.059.001 lead nearly cut in half by disc 
blade 
rifle ball 13.6 0.532 yes fired wood 
and 
sand 
03.019.001 lead  patch marks 
rifle ball (rifled) 13.8 0.535 yes fired  03.227.001  rifling visible (3 maybe 4 
grooves), clear patch marks 
rifle ball 14.1 0.539 yes fired sand 03.104.001 lead patch marks, sprue cut and 
mold seam visible 
probable rifle ball 14.2 0.541 yes fired wood 03.217.001 lead sprue mark, possible patch 
marks on top of sprue cut 
rifle ball 14.3 0.541 yes fired wood 03.008.001 lead  patch marks 
probable rifle ball 14.4 0.543 yes fired  03.103.001 lead  
rifle ball (rifled) 14.5 0.544 yes fired wood 03.091.001 lead rifling marks 
probable rifle ball 14.7 0.546 yes fired wood 03.023.001 lead  ball began to turn inside out 
from direct impact 
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate) 
14.7 0.546 yes fired wood 03.285.001 lead very clear wood impact, also 
very clear ramrod mark 
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate)  
14.9 0.549 yes fired wood 03.016.001 lead massive impact 
rifle ball (rifled) 15 0.551 yes fired wood 03.135.001 lead distinct rifling marks, no 
patch marks, definitely a 
rifled rifle with no patch 
rifle ball 
(indeterminate) 
15.1 0.551 yes fired  03.010.001 lead  patch marks 
rifle ball 
(smoothbore?) 







Ammunition Type Weight Diameter Projected? Fired? Impact Provenience Composition Additional Information 
rifle ball 
(indeterminate) 
15.1 0.552 yes fired wood 03.105.001 lead patch marks 
rifle ball 
(indeterminate) 
15.1 0.551 yes fired wood 03.121.001 lead patch marks 
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate)  
15.1 0.552 yes fired wood 03.136.001 lead  
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate)  
15.1 0.552 yes fired wood 03.175.001  no rifling or patchmarks 




15.2 0.553 yes fired wood 03.029.001 lead patching 
rifle ball (rifled) 15.2 0.553 yes fired wood 03.049.001 lead patch marks and rifling visible 
rifle ball 
(smoothbore) 




15.2 0.553 yes fired wood 03.065.001 lead patch mark, barrel mark 
rifle ball 
(smoothbore) 
15.2 0.553 yes fired wood 03.080.001 lead spectacular patch marks all 
the way around the barrel 




15.2 0.553 yes fired wood 03.215.001  patching, barrel mark with 
patching, good example of 
smoothbore barrel mark, 
clear patch marks, glancing 
wood impact 






Ammunition Type Weight Diameter Projected? Fired? Impact Provenience Composition Additional Information 
rifle ball (rifled) 15.3 0.554 yes fired wood 03.014.001 lead  rifling marks 
rifle ball 
(smoothbore) 
15.3 0.554 yes fired wood 03.030.001 lead strong smooth barrel mark, 
no patching 




15.3 0.554 yes fired wood 03.078.001 lead patch marks, very nice 
smoothbore barrel mark with 
very clear patching 
rifle ball 
(indeterminate) 
15.3 0.554 yes fired wood 03.126.001 lead patch marks 
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate)  
15.3 0.554 yes fired wood 03.181.001  no visible rifling marks 
rifle ball 
(smoothbore) 
15.3 0.554 yes fired wood 17.016.001  multiple clear patch marks, 
smoothbore rifle- cylindrical 
barrel mark 
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate)  
15.4 0.555 yes fired  03.009.001 lead  ram rod mark, "H" imprinted 
on ram rod mark, barrel mark 
rifle ball 
(smoothbore) 
15.4 0.555 yes fired wood 03.031.001 lead smoothbore rifle, barrel 
mark, lots of patch marks, 
whole top of ball covered in 
patch mark 
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate)  
15.4 0.555 yes fired wood 03.041.001 lead massive wood impact 
rifle ball 
(indeterminate) 






Ammunition Type Weight Diameter Projected? Fired? Impact Provenience Composition Additional Information 
rifle ball 
(smoothbore) 
15.4 0.555 yes fired wood 03.096.001 lead patch marks on impact 
surface, possibly hit fabric 
(either someone or its own 
patch on a wood impact), 




15.4 0.555 yes fired  03.153.001 lead no patching visible, possible 
smoothbore barrel mark 
rifle ball (rifled) 15.4 0.555 yes fired wood 05.005.001 lead nice rifling 
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate) 
15.4 0.555 yes fired wood 17.014.001 lead no patching, no rifling, sprue 
cut visible  
rifle ball 
(indeterminate) 
15.5 0.556 yes fired sand 03.027.001 lead fired but undistorted, patch 




15.5 0.556 yes fired wood 03.137.001 lead patch marks 
rifle ball 
(indeterminate) 
15.5 0.556 yes fired  06.005.001 lead patch marks 
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate) 
15.6 0.557 yes fired wood 06.006.001 lead  
rifle ball 
(smoothbore?) 
15.7 0.559 yes fired wood 03.090.001 lead barrel mark, probably 
smoothbore rifle 
probable rifle ball 
(smoothbore) 
15.7 0.559 yes fired wood 03.261.001 lead slight chewing, barrel mark - 
not sure if patching 
rifle ball 
(smoothbore) 
16.1 0.563 yes fired wood 03.001.001 lead  patch marks on sprue, 
smoothbore rifle ball, barrel 






Ammunition Type Weight Diameter Projected? Fired? Impact Provenience Composition Additional Information 
probable rifle ball 16.1 0.563 yes fired wood 03.144.001 lead lightly chewed 
probable rifle ball 17 0.573 yes fired wood 03.082.001 lead gas hole on sprue 
probable rifle ball 17.3 0.577 yes fired wood 17.002.001 lead strong wood grain visible, 
direct wood impact 
rifle ball (rifled) 17.9 0.584 yes fired sand 03.286.001 lead nice rifling marks, unpatched  
trade gun or 
British carbine ball 
18.1 0.586 yes unfired  17.024.001 lead sprue cut and mold seam 
visible (trade gun / British 
carbine size) 
trade gun or 
British carbine 
18.4 0.589 yes unfired  17.015.001 lead sprue and mold seam visible, 
trade gun / British carbine 
size 
carbine or trade 
gun 
19 0.596 yes fired sand 03.284.001 lead impossible to say whether 
trade gun or French carbine 
ball 
carbine or trade 
gun 
19.3 0.598 yes fired sand 03.262.001 lead smooth barrel mark, good 
size for trade gun ball or a 
French carbine ball, (dirty 
ram rod?) 
carbine or trade 
gun 
20 0.606 yes fired  03.269.001 lead smooth barrel mark, air hole 
on sprue, good size for trade 
gun ball or a French carbine 
ball, (dirty ram rod?) Has 
identical ram rod mark as 
03.262.001 
.65 or .67 cal 
carbine or .65 cal 
pistol 






Ammunition Type Weight Diameter Projected? Fired? Impact Provenience Composition Additional Information 
.65 or .67 cal 
carbine or .65 cal 
pistol 
21.1 0.616 yes fired sand 03.152.001 lead full barrel mark (barrel about 
.60 cal.), rammed on axis of 
sprue, carefully loaded 
upright 
.65 or .67 carbine 
or pistol or .69 cal. 
musket 
22.1 0.626 yes fired wood 03.036.001 lead  
.69 cal musket  22.9 0.634 yes fired sand 03.230.001   
.69 cal musket  23.2 0.636 yes fired wood 03.024.001 lead  
.69 cal musket  23.2 0.636 yes fired sand 03.055.001 lead  
.69 cal musket  23.2 0.636 yes fired wood 03.127.001 lead  
.69 cal. musket 23.2 0.636 yes fired  03.288.001 lead very beat up, appears to have 
hit the ground several times  
.69 cal. musket 23.9 0.642 yes fired wood 03.257.001 lead massive wood impact 
.75 cal musket 28.5 0.681 yes fired sand 03.087.001 lead  
.75 cal. musket  28.5 0.681 yes fired wood 06.008.001 lead minor rodent gnawing 
.75 cal musket 28.7 0.683 yes fired sand 03.056.001 lead heavy barrel mark (a .75 cal. 
musket ball, but apparently 
fired in a much smaller barrel, 
probably a .69 cal. musket) 







Ammunition Type Weight Diameter Projected? Fired? Impact Provenience Composition Additional Information 
.75 cal musket 29 0.686 yes fired sand 03.202.001 lead 90 degree sand impact, dead-
on direct hit, very strong 
barrel mark (hypothesized 
that the .75 cal ball was 
rammed into a .69 cal musket 
to achieve greater accuracy) 
.75 cal. musket 29.1 0.687 yes fired sand 03.260.001 lead massive sand impact, hit at a 
45° angle- may have hit the 
parapet of the sap (a good 
sap ball) 
.75 cal musket 29.2 0.687 yes fired sand 03.085.001 lead heavy barrel mark (a .75 cal. 
musket ball, but apparently 
fired in a much smaller barrel, 
probably a .69 cal. musket) 
.75 cal musket 29.2 0.687 yes fired sand 03.086.001 lead heavy barrel mark (a .75 cal. 
musket ball, but apparently 
fired in a much smaller barrel, 
probably a .69 cal. musket). 
Diameter of the completely 
intact barrel mark is only .70" 
even after impact 
.75 cal musket 29.2 0.687 yes fired sand 03.141.001 lead possible complete barrel 
mark 
.75 cal. musket 29.3 0.688 yes fired sand 03.282.001 lead sand impact on both ends 
.75 cal musket 29.4 0.689 yes fired sand 03.018.001 lead at least one barrel scuff mark 






Ammunition Type Weight Diameter Projected? Fired? Impact Provenience Composition Additional Information 
.75 cal musket 29.5 0.689 yes fired sand 03.088.001 lead  
.75 cal. musket 29.5 0.689 yes fired sand 03.293.001 lead light barrel mark, oblique 
sand impact 
.75 cal musket 29.6 0.69 yes fired wood 03.026.001 lead at least one barrel scuff mark, 
minor rodent gnawing 
.75 cal. musket 29.6 0.69 yes fired sand 03.256.001 lead finder's mark, smooth barrel 
mark 
.75 cal. musket 29.7 0.691 yes fired sand 03.263.001 lead old plow cut evident 
.75 cal musket 29.8 0.692 yes fired sand 03.084.001 lead  
.75 cal musket 29.8 0.692 yes fired sand 03.142.001 lead  
.75 cal. musket 29.8 0.692 yes fired sand 03.283.001 lead  
.75 cal musket 29.9 0.692 yes fired sand 03.083.001 lead  
.75 cal musket 29.9 0.692 yes fired sand 03.092.001 lead at least two barrel scuff 
marks, shovel/plow mark 
.75 cal musket 29.9 0.692 yes fired sand 03.149.001 lead  
.75 cal. musket 29.9 0.692 yes fired sand 03.251.001 lead finder's mark, smooth barrel 
mark 
.75 cal. musket 29.9 0.692 yes fired sand 03.266.001 lead big smooth barrel mark, sand 
grains still present 
.75 cal. musket 30 0.693 yes fired wood 03.250.001 lead massive wood impact, quite 
deformed 
.75 cal musket 30.1 0.694 yes fired sand 03.150.001 lead three or four plow/shovel 
marks, at least one barrel 
scuff mark 
.75 cal musket 30.5 0.693 no unfired  03.139.001 lead  






Ammunition Type Weight Diameter Projected? Fired? Impact Provenience Composition Additional Information 
.75 cal. musket 30.5 0.697 yes fired sand 03.279.001 lead strong barrel mark, probably 
fired from a .69 cal. musket, 
oblique sand impact 
.75 cal musket 30.6 0.694 no unfired  03.038.001 lead rolled, with cartridge powder 
mark 
.75 cal. musket  30.6 0.698 yes fired sand 06.007.001 lead at least two barrel scuff 
marks 
.75 cal musket 30.7 0.69 no unfired  03.069.001 lead rolled 
.75 cal musket 30.7 0.686 no unfired  03.077.001 lead crudely trimmed sprue, 
unrolled, light chewing - (not 
the typical British 
manufacture) 
.75 cal musket 30.8 0.699 yes fired sand 03.138.001 lead at least two barrel scuff 
marks, minor rodent gnawing 
.75 cal. musket 31.4 0.704 yes fired sand 03.272.001 lead very strong barrel mark, 
probably fired out of a French 












Table A.2 Spherical shot (Areas 3, 5, and 6) not included in Weight/Diameter Analysis 
 
Ammunition Type Weight Diameter Projected? Fired? Impact Provenience Composition Additional Information 
.75 cal musket 28.8 0.686 no unfired  03.012.001 lead rolled, rodent gnawing, underweight 
.65 cal. carbine / 
.69 cal. musket 
21.4 >.619 yes   03.022.001 lead p.d. >.619", badly chewed and possibly 
underweight 
cut      03.034.001 lead neatly cut quarter section (probable of 
a .75 cal. musket ball) 
.69 or .75 cal 
musket 
26.5 0.665 no unfired  03.044.001 lead alloy 
(pewter?) 
sprue cut, .69 or .75 cal. musket ball 
probable rifle ball 8.2  no fired  03.062.001 lead alloy 
(pewter?) 
 
cut 14.1   fired  03.064.001 lead deliberately cut after firing, probable 
rifle ball 
.75 cal musket 29.2 0.681 no unfired  03.070.001 lead rolled, heavy rodent chewing, 
underweight 
cut 6.8   fired sand 03.089.001 lead cut quarter section, cut before firing 
cut 14.9 >.549 yes fired  03.102.001 lead two axe or knife cuts after firing, 
portion of ball missing, underweight, 
patch marks 
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate)  
15.4  no fired  03.110.001 lead alloy chewed 
probable rifle ball 
(cut) 
13.6 0.532 yes fired  03.120.001 lead square nail hole through entire ball 
and deep knife cut 
probable rifle ball 12.9 0.523 yes   03.123.001 lead heavily hog chewed and possibly 
underweight 
.67 cal. carbine or 
.69 cal. musket 
20.9 0.629 no unfired  03.124.001 lead heavy rodent gnawing, underweight, 






Ammunition Type Weight Diameter Projected? Fired? Impact Provenience Composition Additional Information 
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate)  
15.2  no fired wood 03.130.001 lead alloy 
(pewter?) 
blistered surface, possibly 
underweight for size 
probable rifle ball 11.3  no fired  03.133.001 lead alloy 
(pewter?) 
badly corroded and underweight (p.d. 
as lead .500", actually about .550") 
melted lead 15     03.199.001 lead folded piece of melted lead 
buckshot 2.3   unfired  03.203.001 lead alloy sprue mark and mold seam visible 
buckshot 3.2   fired  03.258.001 lead fired as buckshot, not as "buck and 
ball", not fired as a musket cartridge- 




15.6     03.271.001 lead alloy no rifling visible 
rifle ball (rifled) 15.4   fired  03.273.001 lead alloy unpatched rifling, similar patina as 
03.271.001, probably exact same alloy, 
both some kind of impure lead 
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate)  
15.9   fired  03.276.001 pewter underweight, highly corroded 
probable rifle ball 12.4 0.517 yes unfired 
(?) 
 17.015.002 lead possibly unfired, heavy rodent 
gnawing all over, underweight 










Table A.3 Lead Shot from Metal Detection Areas 4, 11, and 15 
Area 4 
Ammunition Type Weight Diameter Projected? Fired? Impact Provenience Area # Composition Additional Information 
.75 cal. musket 29 0.685 yes fired sand 04.002.001 4   
probable rifle ball 17.1 0.575 yes fired  04.003.001 4 lead  
 
Area 11 
Ammunition Type Weight Diameter Projected? Fired? Impact Provenience Area # Composition Additional Information 
.75 cal. musket 30.3 0.689 no unfired  11.001.001 11   
rifle ball, .65 cal or 
.67 cal. Carbine 
ball, or .65 cal. 
Pistol ball 
19.9 0.61 no unfired  11.003.001 11 lead sprue cut visible 
 
Area 15 
Ammunition Type Weight Diameter Projected? Fired? Impact Provenience Area # Composition Additional Information 
large buckshot or 
small rifle ball 
4.2 0.36 yes fired  15.001.001 15 lead   
rifle ball (rifled) 13.9 0.536 yes fired wood 15.004.001 15 lead rifling marks, impact 
surface is very smooth 
(possibly hit a smooth 









Table A.4 Lead Shot from Area 12 - Overseer's House / Lee's Camp Site (2004-2012) 
Ammunition Type Weight Diameter Projected? Fired? Impact Provenience Composition Additional Information 
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate) 
10.3 0.486 yes fired wood 12.053.001 lead  
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate) 
11.2 0.499 yes fired  12.022.001 lead possible double impact, 
completely mutilated, but 
appears to be complete 
rifle ball 13.9 0.537 yes fired  12.042.001 lead  
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate) 
14.8 0.548 yes fired wood / 
bone 
12.040.001 lead patina burned off 
probable rifle ball 
(rifled) 
15.4 0.555 yes fired  12.023.001 lead a hint of unpatched rifling 
visible, minor rodent chewing 
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate) 
15.4 0.555 yes unfired 
(?) 
 12.059.001 lead whittled or beaten surface 
(facets all over), probably 
unfired, modern plow cut 
(current mass may not be 
indicative of original mass) 
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate) 
16.4 0.567 yes fired wood 12.031.001 lead ball turned inside out due to 
direct wood impact, sprue and 
mold seam visible 
rifle ball (rifled) 16.7 0.57 yes fired wood 12.013.001 lead rifling marks 
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate) 






Ammunition Type Weight Diameter Projected? Fired? Impact Provenience Composition Additional Information 
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate) 
17 0.574 yes fired wood / 
bone 
12.017.001 lead  
trade gun / British 
carbine ball 
17.6 0.581 yes unfired  12.033.001 lead sprue not cut completely, trade 
gun / British carbine size 
trade gun / British 
carbine ball 
19.2 0.598 yes fired bone 12.061.001 lead pieces of bone imbedded in lead 
 
Table A.5 Area 12 shot not included in weight/diameter analysis 
Ammunition Type Weight Diameter Projected? Fired? Impact Provenience Composition Additional Information 
melted lead 12.8     12.019.001 lead probably a ball, but melted, 
recent plow damage 
cut 18.1   unfired  12.028.001 lead sprue, cut nearly in half then 
pushed back together (probably 
to make a fishing sinker) 
melted lead 10.6     12.030.001 lead melted  
melted lead 13.6     12.032.001 lead melted  
cut 4.4     12.041.001 lead cut segment of ball, 15-20% of a 
medium sized ball 








Table A.6 Lead Shot from Metal Detection Area 18 (Camp Site) 
Ammunition Type Weight Diameter Projected? Fired? Impact Provenience Composition Additional Information 
buckshot 2.2 0.29 yes fired  18.028.001 lead period buckshot, mangled 
buckshot 2.3 0.294 yes unfired  18.024.001 lead heavily chewed 
buckshot 2.3 0.294 yes unfired  18.025.001  lead chewed 
buckshot 2.4 0.298 yes unfired  18.015.001 lead  
buckshot 2.4 0.298 yes unfired  18.017.001 lead  
buckshot 2.4 0.298 yes unfired  18.020.001 lead  
buckshot 2.5 0.302 yes unfired  18.003.001 lead  
buckshot 2.5 0.302 yes unfired  18.013.001 lead  
buckshot 2.6 0.306 yes unfired  18.029.001 lead  
buckshot 3 0.321 yes unfired  18.019.001 lead  
buckshot 3.4 0.335 yes unfired  18.003.002 lead  
buckshot 3.5 0.338 yes unfired  18.002.001 lead  
buckshot 3.5 0.338 yes unfired  18.008.001 lead  
buckshot 3.9 0.351 yes unfired  18.016.001 lead large buckshot 
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate) 
6 0.405 yes fired  wood 18.005.001 lead patchmark, possibly from a 
smoothbore rifle (.40 cal. rifle) 
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate) 
8.6 0.457 yes fired sand 18.006.001 lead  
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate) 
14.9 0.549 yes fired sand 18.022.001 lead  
rifle ball (rifled) 15 0.551 yes fired wood 18.007.001 lead unpatched rifling 
British carbine or 
trade gun 
19.2 0.597 yes   18.009.001 lead hog chewed relatively recently, 
good size for either trade gun 
ball or carbine ball 
.69 cal. musket ball 23.5 0.639 yes unfired  18.004.001 lead  






Ammunition Type Weight Diameter Projected? Fired? Impact Provenience Composition Additional Information 
.69 cal. musket ball 28.6 0.64 yes unfired  18.001.001 lead good example of a classic 
musket ball, cold cast wrinkles, 
sprue 
.75 cal. musket ball 30.3 0.695 yes fired sand 18.010.001 lead light sand impact, slight 
smooth barrel mark, definitely 
rolled- British 
 
Table A.7 Area 18 shot not included in weight/diameter analysis 
Ammunition Type Weight Diameter Projected? Fired? Impact Provenience Composition Additional Information 
probable rifle ball 
(indeterminate) 
14.9 0.549 yes fired  18.011.001 lead alloy (>.549 pd.), underweight 
due to alloy, patch marks, 
possibly from smoothbore 
rifle 
half-melted shot     fired  18.012.001 lead fired ball of some kind, half 
of it has melted away 
 
Table A.8 Areas 3, 5, and 6 Canister Shot  
(2004-2012) 
Iron Case Shot (Canister): 
iron canister  03.132.001 
iron canister 03.254.001 
iron canister 06.001.001 
iron canister 17.025.001 
